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Abstract
We investigate the relationship between environmental and financial performance of fossil fuel firms. 
To this extent, we analyze a large international sample of firms in chemicals, oil, gas, and coal with 
respect to several environmental indicators in relation to financial performance for the period 2002–
2013. We find that these firms have significantly higher scores on environmental performance efforts 
than other firms. We use a simultaneous equations system to identify the direction of the relationship 
between environmental and financial performance of the firms. We find that environmental 
outperformance has no impact on financial performance for chemical firms, reduces returns and risks 
for coal companies, has a mixed impact on returns in oil and gas, and reduces financial risks for oil 
and gas firms. Financial outperformance reduces environmental performance in all fossil fuel 
(sub)industries investigated. Our findings mainly support the opportunistic view regarding the impact 
of financial returns, which holds that financial performance negatively impacts social performance. 
Regarding financial risk, we find support for the stakeholder perspective where good environmental 
performance is beneficial from a finance perspective. We conclude to substantial differences in the 
environmental-financial performance relationship along fossil fuel firms in different subindustries.
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Table R.1
List of chemical firms included in the sample
A4NAME country 3-Digit SIC
AECI Limited South Africa 281
AREVA SA France 281
Agrium Inc. Canada 281
Air Liquide SA France 281
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. United States 281
Air Water Inc Japan 281
Airgas, Inc. United States 281
Altana AG Germany 281
Ashland Inc United States 281
BASF SE Germany 281
BOC Group PLC United Kingdom 281
Chemtura Corp United States 281
Elementis plc United Kingdom 281
Engelhard Corp. United States 281
Eramet SA France 281
FMC Corp United States 281
Formosa Chemicals & Fibre Corporation Taiwan 281
Kronos Worldwide, Inc. United States 281
Linde AG Germany 281
Methanex Corporation Canada 281
Mitsubishi Gas Chemical Co Inc Japan 281
Mitsui Chemicals, Inc. Japan 281
Omnia Holdings Limited South Africa 281
Praxair, Inc. United States 281
Taiyo Nippon Sanso Corporation Japan 281
Tokuyama Corporation Japan 281
Uralkaliy OAO Russia 281
W.R. Grace & Co. United States 281
Albemarle Corporation United States 282
Asahi Kasei Corp Japan 282
Celanese Corporation United States 282
Daicel Corp Japan 282
Dow Chemical Co United States 282
EMS-Chemie Holding AG Switzerland 282
Eastman Chemical Company United States 282
Essentra PLC United Kingdom 282
Eternal Material Industry Co Ltd Taiwan 282
Formosa Plastics Corporation Taiwan 282
Hanwha Chemical Corp South Korea 282
Huntsman Corporation United States 282
Koninklijke DSM N.V. Netherlands 282
A4NAME country 3-Digit SIC
Kumho Petro Chemical Co Ltd South Korea 282
Kuraray Co Ltd Japan 282
Lonza Group AG Switzerland 282
Lotte Chemical Corp South Korea 282
Lyondell Chemical Company United States 282
Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings Corp. Japan 282
Nan Ya Plastics Corp Taiwan 282
Rayonier Inc. United States 282
Rhodia France 282
Rockwood Holdings, Inc. United States 282
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co Ltd Japan 282
Showa Denko K.K. Japan 282
Solutia Inc. United States 282
Solvay SA Belgium 282
Synthos S.A. Poland 282
TSRC Corp Taiwan 282
Teijin Ltd Japan 282
Toray Industries Inc Japan 282
Toyobo Co Ltd Japan 282
Victrex plc United Kingdom 282
ZEON CORPORATION Japan 282
Akzo Nobel N.V. Netherlands 285
China Merchants Holdings (Int'l) Co. Ltd Hong Kong 285
Imperial Chemical Industries PLC United Kingdom 285
Kansai Paint Co., Ltd Japan 285
PPG Industries, Inc. United States 285
RPM International Inc. United States 285
Rohm & Haas Company United States 285
Synthomer PLC United Kingdom 285
The Valspar Corp United States 285
Arkema SA France 286
Braskem SA Brazil 286
China Petrochemical Development Corp. Taiwan 286
Huabao International Holdings Limited Hong Kong 286
Inter Pipeline Ltd Canada 286
International Flavors & Fragrances Inc United States 286
KP Chemical Corp South Korea 286
Kemira Oyj Finland 286
LCY Chemical Corp Taiwan 286
MEO Australia Limited Australia 286
Nippon Shokubai Co., Ltd Japan 286
Nippon Kayaku Co Ltd Japan 286
PTT Chemical PCL Thailand 286
The Siam Cement PCL Thailand 286
A4NAME country 3-Digit SIC
Tosoh Corporation Japan 286
Ube Industries, Ltd. Japan 286
Westlake Chemical Corporation United States 286
CF Industries Holdings, Inc. United States 287
China BlueChemical Ltd. China 287
E I Du Pont De Nemours And Co United States 287
Incitec Pivot Limited Australia 287
Israel Chemicals Limited Israel 287
Makhteshim Agan Industries Ltd Israel 287
Mosaic Co United States 287
Nufarm Limited Australia 287
Potash Corp./Saskatchewan Inc. Canada 287
Saudi Arabia Fertilizers Co. Saudi Arabia 287
Scotts Miracle-Gro Co United States 287
Sinofert Holdings Limited Hong Kong 287
Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile SA Chile 287
Superior Plus Corp. Canada 287
Syngenta AG Switzerland 287
Taiwan Fertilizer Co., Ltd. Taiwan 287
UPL Ltd India 287
Vale Fertilizantes SA Brazil 287
Wendel SA France 287
Yara International ASA Norway 287
Avery Dennison Corp United States 289
Cabot Corp United States 289
Celanese AG Germany 289
Chemring Group plc United Kingdom 289
Clariant AG Switzerland 289
Cytec Industries Inc United States 289
DIC Corporation Japan 289
FMC Technologies, Inc. United States 289
Hercules Inc United States 289
Lanxess AG Germany 289
NOVA Chemicals Corp Canada 289
Nalco Holding Company United States 289
Neo Material Technologies Inc. Canada 289
Nissan Chemical Industries, Ltd. Japan 289
Orica Ltd Australia 289
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation Saudi Arabia 289
Sika AG Switzerland 289
Sumitomo Chemical Co Ltd Japan 289
Tokai Carbon Co Ltd Japan 289
Zeltia SA Spain 289
Figure R.1
Environmental scores for non-fossil and fossil fuel-related industries by year
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11. Introduction
Given the impact of fossil fuels on climate change, it seems very relevant to investigate how the 
environmental performance of fossil fuel firms (firms in oil and gas, coal, and chemicals) relates to 
their financial performance. More specifically, is good financial performance associated with sound 
environmental performance, or is there a trade-off? Further, is this relationship the same along 
different performance measures and (sub)industries? Answering these questions is important to assess 
the potential for changes in operations by fossil fuel firms to transform the energy system. Several 
studies find that energy-intense companies are punished by the stock market for poor environmental 
performance (see Patten, 1992; Kolk et al., 2001; Kollias et al., 2012). These studies usually focus on 
the impact of events on company reputation (see, e.g., Spence, 2011), but not on company operations 
and related cash flows. Scholtens (2008) and Lioui and Sharma (2012) investigate the potential 
reasons why there would be a link between environmental and financial performance. The former 
study finds that it is highly dependent on the way in which these performances are being measured. 
The latter finds a negative direct impact of environmental on financial performance but a positive 
indirect impact. 
Our study specifically investigates environmental and financial performance of fossil fuel firms. As 
such, it tries to focus on a much more homogeneous category than understood by the concept ‘social 
performance’ and its equivalents, which also relates to governance, ethical, and social issues with 
firms. To be precise, we investigate environmental and financial performance in three subindustries: 
chemicals, coal, and oil and gas. We rely on both qualitative and quantitative environmental 
performance indicators that are much more fine-grained than those used in the literature thus far. 
Further, we rely on different financial performance measures to avoid biases and to account for the 
underlying value structure of firms. We also address endogeneity and try to detect structural relations 
between environmental and financial performance. We find that fossil fuel firms have significantly 
higher scores for their environmental performance efforts relative to firms in other industries, but it 
shows that this is highly sensitive to (sub)industry classification. It will not come as a surprise that we 
also find that fossil fuel firms produce more waste and emissions than firms in other industries. 
Further, we find that environmental outperformance does have no impact on financial performance for 
2chemical firms, reduces returns and risks for coal companies, and has a mixed impact on returns in oil 
and gas, and reduces financial risks for firms in oil and gas. Financial outperformance reduces 
environmental performance in all the types of fossil fuel firms investigated. This shows that there are 
substantial differences in the relationships studied for the different subindustries. These findings 
suggest that any policy approach should account for the value chain at the subindustry level, since a 
‘one size fits all’ policy is likely to have very distorting effects and, hence, to be ineffective.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss the background of the relationship 
between financial and environmental performance of the fossil fuel firms (i.e. firms in oil and gas, 
coal, chemicals). Then, we introduce the data and methods employed in our analysis. Next, we report 
the results from the univariate analysis and show the estimation results of the regression models. 
Finally, we discuss our conclusions.
2. Background and Hypotheses
Bénabou and Tirole (2006, 2010) argue that there are basically three reasons as to why firms and 
institutions would want to behave in a responsible manner (please note that these responsibilities 
pertain to environmental, ethical, social and governance characteristics). The first is altruism, that is, 
‘doing the right thing’. Here, the firm does incur costs to avoid or reduce externalities, but does not 
necessarily get something in return, such as lower expenses or higher revenues. The second reason is 
greenwashing, where the firm claims to behave in a responsible manner to gain benefits, but does not 
actually change the way it operates nor internalize externalities. The third reason is strategic behavior. 
Here, the firm makes an effort and incurs real costs to reduce externalities. However, it also succeeds 
in increasing its revenues from behaving in a responsible manner. Firms act on the basis of all three 
reasons, but may place different weightings on each of them, resulting in differing outcomes regarding 
social responsibility.
Views regarding the social (in a broad encompassing sense) responsibilities of companies mainly hold 
that their responsibilities go beyond maximizing shareholder returns, including a focus on the 
environment, ethical conduct of business operations, and responsibility to stakeholders (Campbell, 
2007). From this perspective, companies should adopt policies and practices that align with the wider 
3societal good (Matten and Moon, 2008). This approach aims at stakeholders like employees, 
customers, suppliers, communities, regulators, and the environment. The social policies and practices 
of firms reflect a behavioral standard regarding their social responsibilities (Campbell, 2007). It 
appears that the results of company policies and practices may vary widely and bear no 
straightforward relationship with financial performance (Dam and Scholtens, 2015). Furthermore, 
policies and practices regarding corporate responsibility often are not clearly defined and go beyond 
what is written into laws and regulations (Heal, 2008; Chatterji et al., 2009).
Two meta-studies that investigate the literature on the financial and responsibility performance of 
firms are Wu (2006) and Margolis et al. (2009). Wu (2006) researches the relationships between the 
financial and responsibility performance of firms (the latter relates to the environmental, social and 
governance performance of firms in general within the context of his research). This author arrives at 
several results: (1) there is a positive relationship between responsibility and financial performance 
indicators; (2) market-based measures are weaker predictors of responsibility than other financial 
measures, such as accounting indicators; and (3) perception-based measures report a stronger 
responsibility–financial performance relationship than performance-based measures. Margolis et al. 
(2009) find a small but statistically significant positive correlation between financial and social 
performance. One problem with such meta-analyses is that a lot of information gets lost and that 
studies are equally weighted despite huge differences in research design and quality. 
Apart from methodological problems, indicators of social responsibility as well as those of financial 
performance widely differ among the studies included. Margolis et al. (2009) and Schulze and 
Trommer (2012) specifically mention this problem and the challenge of defining the responsibility 
construct. Indicators and measures of responsibility tend to capture either a single specific dimension, 
such as philanthropic donations or pollution control, or are broad appraisals of responsibility as a 
whole, like ratings. The issue of multi-dimensionality also plays a role with financial indicators (see 
Dam and Scholtens, 2015). For example, Gregory et al. (2014) mention that accounting measures are 
backward looking, and their objectivity and informational value is questionable. Stock market 
measures, by contrast, are much more forward-looking, with expectations of future cash flows and 
timing of these flows as well as risk embedded within the stock price (Gregory et al., 2014).
4Based on Preston and O’Bannon (1997), Scholtens (2008) provides a brief overview as to why there 
might be a particular causal relationship between financial and environmental or social performance. 
There can be a negative link as the latter involves costs and therefore weakens the firm’s competitive 
position, suggesting there is a trade-off between the two. As such, environmental and social issues 
may conflict with value maximizing behavior. In addition, managers may engage with social and 
environmental issues from an opportunistic perspective which may conflict with stakeholder and 
shareholder objectives. the managerial opportunism theory. This approach states that ‘when financial 
performance is strong, managers may attempt to cash in by reducing social expenditure in order to take 
advantage of the opportunity to increase their own short-term private gains’ (Allouche and Laroche, 
2005). This is a form of agency costs. It also works the other way around: when financial performance 
weakens, managers might engage in social programs to offset or justify their disappointing results. The 
opportunism approach follows agency theory. Here, one believes a manager, when possible, has an 
incentive to put private gains first. When financial performance is strong, managerial opportunism 
expects less social performance. Thus, the opportunism approach assumes that financial performance 
precedes social performance. Please not that there can also be a positive association. For example, 
satisfying stakeholders’ non-financial interests may result in improving the firm’s financial 
performance due to increased loyalty. Firms do have a social impact and there is a demand from 
stakeholders for responsible conduct of the firm and in equilibrium the costs and benefits of servicing 
this demand would cancel out.
As to the direction of the causality, there is the financial resources-based view where financial means 
are essential in order to invest in responsible conduct and performance (the availability of funds, 
hereafter ‘resources’). According to Orlitzky et al. (2003), the resource perspective suggests that 
investments in social performance may help firms develop new competencies, resources, and 
capabilities which are manifested in a firm’s culture, technology, structure, and human resources (see 
also Russo and Fouts, 1997). Orlitzky et al. (2003) argue that social performance may help build 
managerial competencies because preventive efforts necessitate significant employee involvement, 
organization-wide coordination, and a forward thinking managerial style. They conclude that social 
5performance can help management develop better scanning skills, processes, and information systems, 
which increase the organization’s preparedness for external changes, turbulence, and crises. The same 
type of causality does occur in the more classical view of production which does occur to the 
detriment of social welfare (i.e. the classical externalities). 
The causality can also run from environmental to financial performance. This is the case with 
stakeholder theory (which assumes a positive relationship) and the trade-off perspective (which 
assumes a negative relationship). Stakeholder theory suggests that social performance is positively 
associated with financial performance because it enhances the satisfaction of various stakeholders - 
and consequently the firm’s external reputation – and leads to better financial performance (Allouche 
and Laroche, 2005). According to Preston and O’Bannon (1997), there is a lead-lag relationship 
between social and financial performance; external reputation (favorable or unfavorable) develops 
first, then financial results (favorable or unfavorable) follow.’’ According to Orlitzky et al. (2003) 
managers can increase the efficiency of their organization’s adaption to external demands by 
addressing and balancing the claims of multiple stakeholders. Donaldson and Preston (1995) state that 
the widely believed notion is that stakeholder management contributes to successful economic 
performance, but they add that this is insufficient to stand alone as a basis for the stakeholder theory. 
They state that ‘’studies have tended to generate implications suggesting that adherence to stakeholder 
principles and practices achieves conventional corporate performance objectives as well or better than 
rival approaches’’ (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
As to the trade-off view, Preston and O’Bannon (1997) argue that social performance is the 
independent variable and that social accomplishments involve financial costs. Allouche and Laroche 
(2005) mention that ’because social accomplishments involve financial costs, social responsibility may 
siphon off capital and other resources from the firm, putting it at a disadvantage compared to other 
firms that are less socially active. Lioui and Sharma (2008) assess the impact of environmental 
performance on financial performance as measured by return on assets and Tobin’s Q. They find a 
negative relationship between the two. However, they also detect a positive indirect effect as 
environmental performance fosters R&D efforts which general additional value for the firm (Lioui and 
6Sharma, 2008). Pätäri et al. (2014) investigate how qualitative assessments of social responsibility 
“strengths and concerns” relate to the financial performance of 14 energy companies. They use 
Granger causality tests and find that social responsibility concerns Granger-cause corporate 
profitability and market value, whereas social responsibility strengths Granger-cause only market 
value. Furthermore, financial performance does not Granger-cause corporate social responsibility 
(Pätäri et al., 2014). However, they don’t investigate environmental performance and refrain from 
investigating financial risk, and rely on accounting information only.
Stock market returns are widely used to analyze financial performance in relation to corporate social 
responsibility (see Margolis et al., 2009). But studies based on this indicator can produce misleading 
results because, in an efficient market, returns may be expected to reflect only (unexpected) changes in 
corporate social performance. This is problematic, as there is evidence to suggest that social 
responsibility indicators may be sticky (Chatterji et al., 2009). If social responsibility levels remain 
unchanged or if the changes are relatively small, then a returns-based study can give the impression 
that corporate social performance does not affect financial performance. But even when returns-based 
studies find some financial impact from social responsibility, care needs to be taken regarding 
interpretation of the results. For example, El Ghoul et al. (2011) find that firms with high social 
responsibility have lower cost of capital. Long-run returns to firms with high social responsibility may 
be lower for a given expected future cash flow because they are subject to less market risk. Then, if 
social responsibility does lower a firm’s cost of capital, focusing solely on returns to indicate its 
financial impact will be misleading (Dam and Scholtens, 2015). 
Understanding the overall financial implications of social responsibility requires that attention be 
given to both stock returns and firm value. To this extent, Dam and Scholtens (2015) provide 
underpinnings for the actual behavior of market participants. They relate social performance to 
measures like the market-to-book ratio (firm market value in relation to accounting value), return on 
assets, and stock market return. They conclude that there is a strong theoretical foundation for a 
positive relationship between social responsibility and financial performance, and argue that the 
relation is highly conditional on which financial performance measure is considered (Dam and 
7Scholtens, 2015). Gregory et al. (2014) argue that markets positively value most aspects of social 
responsibility, and do so because, in the long run and measured across most dimensions, high social 
responsibility firms have a higher expected growth rate in their abnormal earnings. But this seems to 
be due primarily to industry effects rather than to a particular social responsibility strategy. Therefore, 
it is important to investigate different financial performance measures alongside a host of 
environmental indicators, and to focus on specific industries.
Heal (2008) argues that when a firm’s private and social costs are about the same, markets generally 
are beneficial for society. However, when corporate and social costs are not closely aligned, markets 
do not work so well for society. In this respect, the conflicts between corporations and society over 
environmental issues almost always derive from the external costs associated with pollution (Heal, 
2008). Firms may try to internalize some of these external costs and, as such, act in a more socially 
responsible manner. In part, this results from pressure of the market and society and this is stronger 
when the firm operates closer to both of these (e.g., there will be more scrutiny on firms in the 
downstream of the supply chain than in the upstream). Further, it appears that, in relating 
environmental performance to financial performance, it is important to pay attention to various types 
of indicator, as environmental performance is not a one-dimensional construct (Chatterji et al., 2009; 
Schulze and Trommer, 2012). Heal (2008) regards companies particularly in the tobacco, alcohol, 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and energy industries as facing great discrepancies between private and 
social costs. This is illustrated by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), who find that investment portfolios 
consisting of firms in the tobacco, alcohol, and gambling industries in the US outperform portfolios 
without these industries. This suggests that these firms face higher cost of capital and incur more risk 
to attract investors. 
We focus on the fossil fuel-intense firms (especially firms in oil and gas, coal, chemicals) and their 
environmental performance. Energy is a critical input to economic and societal processes and a part of 
all production processes. Thus far, several studies investigate the societal impact of energy companies. 
In this respect, they usually investigate disasters such as explosions or oil spills (e.g., Patten and 
Nance, 1998; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2009). Further, the nature of these firms’ operations 
8requires high environmental exposure. Therefore, they are subject to economic, financial and political 
risks that are at least different in other industries. Thus, environmental outperformance can be 
regarded as a strategy of energy firms to limit their exposure and/or to improve their reputation (Heal, 
2008). Kolk and Levy (2001) show that energy firms invest resources in low-emission and renewable 
sources as well as in anticipating regulation to hedge themselves against exposure to the 
environmental and societal impact of their operations.
From this broad overview of the literature, we arrive at several hypotheses we want to put to the test:
First, based on the views of a.o. Kolk et al. (2001), Heal (2008), and Kollias et al. (2012), is that 
we want to find out whether environmental performance of our sample of fossil firms differs from that 
of other firms. Here, based on the literature discussed above, we hypothesize that their policies will be 
more intense and that they score relatively high on environmental policies (H1).
Second is that their actual performance in terms of emissions may be worse as this basically is the 
reason as to why they would engage more with environmental responsibility (H2). This would be 
reflected in much more efforts regarding emission reduction, product innovation and resource 
reduction of the fossil fuel firms. 
Next, we assume that within this group of firms, the performance of chemical firms is superior to 
that of oil & gas and coal companies (H3). This is because chemical firms operate closer to the market 
of end-users and are more competitive than the energy industry (Budde, 2011). In this respect, Heal 
(2008) argues that firms that are more subject to the scrutiny of market participants are more likely to 
invest in responsibility. However, he relates this argument to broad-based industry classifications. 
Kolk et al. (2001) investigate reporting practices at the industry level and their study tends to confirm 
Heal’s view. We want to find out whether this also is the case for an industry that already is regarded 
as problematic. We don’t expect a significant difference between oil and gas companies vis-à-vis coal 
companies as they are more or less in the same position in this respect. 
As to the relationship between financial and environmental performance, i.e. both the direction 
and the positive or negative relationship, we want to find out which of the different theoretical 
approaches in this respect would appear to hold (see Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Scholtens, 2008). 
9As such, we want to test whether the stakeholder theory (H4), the trade-off view (H5), the resources 
approach (H6), or the opportunism view (H7) does hold for our samples. 
Thus, in H4 we test stakeholder theory which assumes there is a positive impact from 
environmental to financial performance.
In H5 we test the trade-off hypothesis which holds that there is a negative impact from 
environmental to financial performance. 
In H6 we test the resources approach which implies that financial performance is having a positive 
impact on environmental performance.
In H7 about the opportunism hypothesis which holds that financial performance will negatively 
impact environmental performance. 
Further, in line with Pätäri et al. (2014), we try to find out what determines firms’ environmental 
performance and whether this differs for fossil fuel firms compared to other (i.e., non-fossil) firms. 
3. Data and Method
We investigate environmental and financial performance of a large international sample of firms in 
both fossil fuel-related (firms in oil and gas, coal, chemicals) and ´non-fossil fuel-related´ industries 
(of course, we are well aware of the indirect usage of fossil fuels in all firms and in fact there is no 
industry that does not indirectly consume any fossil fuel) for the period 2002–2013. This period is 
motivated primarily on the basis of data availability of both the financial and the environmental 
variables. As to the fossil fuel firms, we include all firms in the following 2-digit SIC codes: 12 
(‘coal’), 13 (‘oil and gas’), and 28 and 29 (‘chemicals’). 
The quality of the ways in which responsibility is measured is a concern in the academic literature (see 
Chatterji et al., 2009; Schultze and Trommer, 2012). Most research on corporate social responsibility 
tends to rely on qualitative assessments from specialized ratings agencies. However, such assessment 
is usually based on specialist views regarding corporate policies and not so much on actual firm 
performance (Chatterji et al., 2009). Further, the assessment is not verified and cannot be replicated by 
outsiders. Since the relationship between policy and performance is not one-on-one, it would be better 
to use both types of indicators, namely, categorical assessment data and environmental performance 
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data for one specific industry, and to compare across industries. Therefore, we will want to use a wide 
array of indicators. 
Our data about environmental performance are gathered from the Worldscope database provided by 
Thomson Reuters. The selection of sample firms is based on data availability at the ASSET4 ESG 
database in Worldscope. The literature is divided in terms of selecting data source to measure 
environmental as well as social and governance scores when they use an international sample. Arouri 
and Pijourlet (2016) use Intangible Value Assessment ratings from MSCI and list the following studies 
to use the same: Derwall et al., 2005; Aktas et al., 2011; Guenster et al., 2011; Marsat and Williams, 
2013. However, the coverage of ASSET4 ESG database has increased importantly, and therefore the 
choice of very recent studies (i.e., Cheng et al., 2014; Stellner et al., 2015; Feng et al., 2015; El Ghoul 
et al., 2016). We also feel ASSET4 is to be preferred due to the consistency in the reporting (e.g. 
MSCI is faced with a major structural break in the series in 2009). Further, the same provider, i.e. 
ThomsonReuters, also provides financial information about the companies. Therefore, it is likely that 
the matching errors will be much more limited than in the case of combining different data sources.
The ASSET4 ESG database carries historical data for several key performance indicators on four 
pillars: economy, environment, social, and corporate governance. The ASSET4 ESG framework 
allows us to rate and compare companies against approximately 700 individual data points, which are 
combined into over 250 key performance indicators. The scores on the key performance indicators are 
aggregated into a framework of 18 categories grouped within the four pillars, which are integrated into 
a single overall score. This database has gathered data from publicly available information, such as 
company websites, annual reports, and proxy files since 2002. Therefore, our analysis will cover the 
period 2002 to 2013. The coverage of the database originally was limited to US and European firms, 
but expanded in more recent years. As such, we have an unbalanced panel. We will report the results 
of our analysis for the overall sample in the main text, but we will also report them for subsamples of 
countries in the appendix and discuss these in the main analysis. 
In our analysis, first we use overall percentage scores of the environment pillar (the Environmental 
Score), and extend our analysis to the three constituting categories of environmental performance: 
emissions reduction, product innovation, and resource reduction. Environmental score in fact measures 
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a company's impact on living and non-living natural systems, including air, land, and water, as well as 
complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best management practices to avoid 
environmental risks and to capitalize on environmental opportunities to generate long-term 
shareholder value. The three constituting categories (emissions reduction, product innovation, resource 
reduction) are labeled categorical indicators in the remainder of this paper. Next, we employ variables 
that are much closer to actual environmental performance, such as emissions and expenses. Appendix 
A provides definitions of the environmental variables used.
Financial data also are collected from Datastream/Worldscope for firms with available environmental 
performance indicators. We eliminate financial firms to avoid issues of regulatory influence on these 
firms. We compute five financial performance variables from the same database; three relate to value 
and return and two to risk. As to the former, we investigate two market performance variables, namely 
stock market excess returns, the difference in the percentage change in the US dollar stock return 
between the beginning and end of a year and the annual local market index return, and Tobin’s Q, the 
ratio of (book value of total assets + market value of common equity − book value of common equity) 
to the book value of total assets. The accounting performance measure is the widely used return on 
equity, the ratio of net income to common equity. Further, and novel in this strand of the literature, we 
include two specific risk measures. The first is business risk, which measures firm earnings volatility 
as an unsystematic risk and is computed as the standard deviation of operating income ratio over three-
year overlapping periods of the sample period. (Operating income ratio is the ratio of operating 
income, which is the difference between sales and operating expenses, to sales.) The second is Beta, 
which measures the firm’s systematic risk and is calculated using daily stock returns in each year by 
running regressions for the firm’s stock returns against local market index returns for each firm.
Worldscope data may contain errors, and thus all financial variables are winsorized at 0.01 and 0.99 to 
avoid outliers affecting results. Compared to previous studies (Patten and Nance, 1998; Capelle-
Blancard and Laguna, 2009; Henriques and Sadorsky, 2010; Pätäri et al., 2014; Arslan-Ayaydin and 
Thewissen, 2015), our sample is highly international (it encompasses firms from over 50 countries), 
focuses on a more recent period, and uses a much wider scope of both financial and environmental 
indicators. More specifically, we include excess stock returns among the financial performance 
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measures, account for risk characteristics, and concentrate on both qualitative and quantitative aspects 
of environmental performance. As such, we feel we are able to arrive at a much more detailed 
inspection of the interaction between environmental and financial performance.
We first perform univariate tests for comparisons of the means and the medians of the variables 
between the fossil fuel firms (chemicals, coal, oil and gas) and other firms. Standard t-tests for mean 
and non-parametric tests for median are used for statistical comparisons. Next, we concentrate on 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimations for the effects of financial performance 
variables on environmental performance scores. We investigate all industries within the economy 
(except for banks and other financial services providers) and control for the fossil fuel firms via a 
dummy variable. In this respect, we focus on firms’ overall environmental score and its constituent 
categories (emissions reduction, product innovation, and resource reduction). We do this for the 
specific environmental performance indicators as well. We use the interaction variables between the 
fossil energy industry dummy and financial performance variables to test whether the effects of 
financial performance variables on environmental performance are statistically different between the 
fossil fuel firms and those in other industries. In line with the literature, we control for size, which is 
the natural logarithm of book value of assets in US dollars, research and development expenditures 
(R&D) scaled by book value of total assets, financial leverage, the ratio of the total of short- and long-
term debt to book value of total assets, and net working capital, the ratio of the difference between 
current assets and current liabilities to book value of total assets, to control the liquidity of firms. We 
use country and year fixed effects in all regressions.
In our research framework, we propose that financial performance determines environmental 
performance, but we acknowledge that it could also be plausible, as documented in the literature, that 
environmental performance affects financial performance (see Margolis et al., 2009). In this case, the 
environmental performance equation contains an endogenous variable, financial performance, and vice 
versa. To address this reverse causality problem, as well as the possibility that some of the 
independent variables are jointly determined, we create a system of structural equations, including two 
equations for environmental and financial performance, separately. To estimate the model, we perform 
a three-stage process for systems of simultaneous equations by using two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
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estimations for each equation. We produce the three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimates from a three-
step process: In step one, we develop instrumental variable equations for both environmental and 
financial performance variables. The two instruments in the environmental performance equation are 
averages of the scores by country/year and by country/industry score (Cheng et al., 2014). We use 
leverage and net working capital as instruments of financial performance (see Vishani and Shah, 2007; 
Afza and Nazir, 2009). We use all other variables explained in the OLS regression analysis above as 
control variables along with country and year fixed effects, and expect them to impact the relationship 
in line with the literature (Wu et al., 2006; Margolis et al., 2009). These two equations create the 
predicted values resulting from a regression of each endogenous variable on all exogenous variables in 
the system; this is identical to the first step in conventional 2SLS. Thus, the 3SLS process creates a 
consistent estimate for the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances. These estimates are based 
on the residuals from the 2SLS estimation of each structural equation. In the last step of the third 
stage, the 3SLS performs a generalized least squares (GLS) type estimation using the covariance 
matrix estimated in the second stage, and with the instrumented values in place of the right-hand-side 
endogenous variables.
4. Results
We first present the descriptive statistics and the univariate analysis. Then, we provide the findings 
from the regression analyses.
4.1 Univariate analysis
Table 1 is an overview of the country composition of the sample. It shows that in the 51 countries 
under investigation, there are more than 23,000 firm-year observations, among which about 12% are 
fossil fuel firms. Most observations are for the US, Japan, and the UK; together the three make up 
53% of total observations (that is also the main reason why will provide estimation results for 
subsamples in the Appendix, namely for Australia, Canada, Japan, UK, and US, for the sample 
excluding the UK and the US, and for the full sample excluding the US). Table 1 reports the means for 
the overall environmental score. Please see Appendix A for the definition of all the variables used in 
this construct. The environmental score is a performance pillar reflecting how well—according to the 
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rating agency—a company uses best management practices to avoid environmental risks and to 
capitalize on environmental opportunities to generate long-term shareholder value. A higher score 
relates to relatively more (perceived) efforts by the firm. However, this score does not necessarily 
imply that the firm is cleaner or better from an environmental perspective. To that extent, one has to 
investigate the actual performance indicators, which will be done later on in this study. 
Table 1 reveals that the environmental score is higher for the 2,739 fossil fuel firms (comprising firms 
in oil and gas, coal and chemicals) compared to the 20,568 non-fossil fuel firms (54.1 versus 51.6). 
This suggests support for the first hypothesis where it was assumed that fossil fuel firms would 
outperform others in this respect. Table 1 shows that fossil fuel firms in Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Hungary, and Italy have the highest environmental scores, whereas those in Ireland, Singapore, and 
Sweden have the lowest. 
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 2 sets forth the sample composition for the 44 industries and their performance with respect to 
the main variables of interest. This table shows that most observations are for firms in oil and gas, 
business services, and in retail. The sectoral distribution of the observations is much less skewed than 
in the case of the country distribution: the three largest (oil and gas, retail, and business services) make 
up 20% of the total sample. Table 2 shows that the mean of the encompassing environmental score is 
relatively high (above 66) in aircraft, automobiles, computer hardware, business supplies, electronic 
equipment, consumer goods, chemicals, and recreation. It is relatively low (33 or less) in agriculture, 
defense, entertainment, personal care, precious metals, healthcare, and other industries. Among the 
fossil fuel firms, there is a marked difference between chemicals (68.7) on the one hand, and coal 
(39.1) and oil and gas (46.8) on the other. This is confirmation for the third hypothesis about the 
relative performance of fossil fuel subindustries. We want to point out that these findings align only to 
some degree with the general view put forward by Heal (2008). Industries with substantial 
externalities, such as the aircraft, auto, chemical, machinery, rubber, shipping, steel, and tobacco 
industries, indeed score relatively high on the environmental score. However, this also is the case with 
industries where the differential between social and private costs seems much less obvious, including 
the computer hardware, business supplies, and recreation industries. 
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As to financial performance, Table 2 shows that the Tobin’s Q of chemicals, and oil and gas is 
relatively low. Their excess stock return is higher than that of coal firms and of firms in most other 
sectors/industries. For coal, the excess stock return is below the average of non-fossil fuel industries. 
Return on equity is about the same in the three fossil fuel-related sectors and slightly lower than with 
non-fossil fuel firms. The financial risk indicators reveal that most indicators for all three types of 
fossil fuel firms sectors are much higher than those elsewhere. The exception is business risk in 
chemicals, which appears low compared to the average of the non-fossil fuel firms. In general, these 
findings are in line with those found elsewhere (e.g., Schultze and Trommer, 2012; Pätäri et al., 2014; 
Arslan-Ayaydin and Thewissen, 2015).
[Insert Table 2 about here]
More detailed descriptives are shown in the six panels in Table 3, which also reports the median 
performances and provides more information regarding firm characteristics and environmental 
indicators. Furthermore, this table reports the test results regarding the differences between the mean 
and median performance of different subgroups (i.e., fossil fuel-intense firms and non-fossil fuel-
intense firms; chemicals versus coal and oil and gas). Panel A in Table 3 compares the main financial 
characteristics. It shows that fossil fuel firms have lower Tobin’s Q, higher excess stock market 
returns, are more risky, are much larger, have less R&D as well as less working capital, and have 
slightly lower leverage. In most cases, the differences are statistically significant with 99% confidence, 
both in the means and medians (except leverage). Return on equity does not significantly differ 
between fossil fuel firms and the other firms.
Panel B reports the differences between overall environmental score and the three other categorical 
indicators (emission reduction, product innovation, resource reduction). In this respect, the fossil fuel 
firms perform significantly better on overall environmental score and on efforts toward emission 
reduction, but do not significantly differ from other firms with respect to product innovation and 
resource reduction. Therefore, regarding the environmental score in general and the emission 
reductions in particular, we find support for H1, but not for H2. We don’t find this in the case of 
product innovation and resource reduction.
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Panel C gives details of the financial characteristics of firms in the three fossil fuel-related sectors and 
compares chemical firms with coal and oil and gas firms. This panel shows that median Tobin’s Q and 
excess stock market return is significantly higher with chemicals but that the mean is not. Further, 
there is no statistically significant difference regarding stock market returns, and only a marginally 
significant (10% significance) difference for the median of return on equity. However, risk in coal and 
in oil and gas is much higher than that with chemicals. R&D and working capital are lower with coal 
and oil and gas firms compared to chemical firms; also, the former (especially oil and gas) are much 
larger than chemical firms.
Panel D provides an overview of the univariate tests of the four categorical environmental indicators 
for the three sectors. This panel clearly shows that chemical firms have much better environmental 
performance scores than those in coal, oil, and gas. This is supportive for H3 regarding the 
subindustries in fossil.
Panel E shows the performance of fossil fuel firms compared to other firms for a large number of 
environmental performance indicators. This panel shows that the fossil fuel firms exhibit greater use 
of resources, water, and energy, and generate more emissions of all types. This is clearly in support of 
our second hypothesis. The mean for their NOx and SOx emissions and their waste production is 
lower than in non- fossil fuel firms, but the median shows they are higher. The mean of the fossil fuel 
firms regarding the amount of waste is lower than with the non- fossil fuel firms, but the median does 
not confirm this. Resource-use reduction policies and monitoring in the non-fossil fuel firms are seen 
as superior to those with the fossil fuel firms. This contrasts with H1.
Panel F in Table 3 shows the performance on environmental indicators of different types of fossil fuel 
firms: It compares firms in chemicals with those in coal and in oil and gas. This panel shows that the 
latter have higher environmental expenditures and environmental provisions (in line with Heal, 2008). 
Coal and oil and gas firms also have higher NOx, SOx, and volatile organic compound (VOC) 
emissions than chemical firms. For most other environmental indicators (e.g., CO2 equivalent 
emissions, water use, waste production, and energy use), chemical firms put more pressure on the 
environment. But this sector’s emission reduction efforts rate better than those in the oil and gas and in 
coal. The policies, implementation, and monitoring of emission reduction of chemical firms is 
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perceived as better than that of the coal and the oil and gas firms. As such, these findings confirm H3 
and are in line with those of Pätäri et al. (2014) and Arslan-Ayaydin and Thewissen (2015) on the 
basis of KLD MSCI data.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
4.2 Regression analysis
Table 4 reports the estimation results of the OLS regressions, where the environmental category 
proxies are regressed against financial variables. Thus, first, we try to explain what determines the 
overall environmental score and its three categorical components, namely, emissions reduction, 
product innovation, and resource reduction. The model accounts for a dummy variable to compare 
fossil fuel firms with non- fossil fuel firms, and interaction effects. As such, we investigate the impact 
of financial performance of a firm on environmental score, conditional on the firm belonging to one of 
the three fossil fuel-related sectors. Apart from the five financial performance indicators, we use firm 
size, leverage, R&D expenditure, and working capital as control variables, as in many studies on the 
relationship between financial and social performance (see Wu et al., 2006; Margolis et al., 2009). All 
regressions are run controlling for country and year fixed effects.
The estimated coefficients of the dummy variable representing fossil fuel firms (Dummy_Fossil) show 
that this variable is indeed a significant factor for the overall environmental score, and that it 
specifically relates to the emission reduction categorical score and to the product innovation category, 
which supports both H1 and H2. Further, Table 4 reveals that there is a mixed picture regarding how 
the financial performance indicators and the control variables relate to the different environmental 
categories. Tobin’s Q is positively associated with environmental performance, but the significant 
coefficient of the interaction term reveals that the relationship is, in fact, a negative one for fossil fuel 
firms. This implies that firms that are relatively highly valued are associated with relatively low 
environmental categorical scores. This suggests that with fossil fuel firms there is a trade-off regarding 
firm value and environmental performance, which confirms the opportunism hypothesis (H7). Excess 
stock returns are negatively related to the overall environmental score and to the resources category. 
Here, we find that the interaction with energy is statistically significant and there is a positive 
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relationship between excess returns and environmental performance. This supports the resources 
hypothesis (H6). For our third measure, return on equity, we find that these returns have a positive 
impact on the environmental performance scores but if we interact with the fossil fuel dummy, there is 
no significance. In general, these findings are in line with the predictions of Gregory et al. (2014) and 
Dam and Scholtens (2015). For business risk, there is a negative and significant relationship with 
environmental performance but if we investigate the interaction with Dummy_Fossil, it shows that this 
doesn’t have a significant role to play. For Beta as a risk indicator, we find that there is a statistically 
significant and positive relationship with the environmental categories. But, as with business risk, we 
don’t find that fossil fuel as such has an impact here (apart from a marginal negative impact regarding 
the product category). As to the controls, size clearly and positively contributes to a high score on the 
categorical environmental indicators, as do R&D and availability of net working capital. However, 
again, leverage is not significantly associated with environmental performance.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In Appendix B, we show the estimation results of the same model used to arrive at the findings in 
Table 4, but focus on geographic subsamples. Appendix B.1 gives the results for a sample of 
Australia, Canada, Japan, the UK, and the US, who make up about two thirds of the total sample. This 
shows that the relationships are much weaker than in the overall sample. Here, there is only weak 
support in the case of Tobin’s Q and there is no longer a positive relationship between excess stock 
returns in energy and environmental performance. Therefore, we conclude that there is no longer 
support for the hypotheses. Further, it shows that business risk in energy positively impacts 
environmental product performance. Appendix B.2 shows the results when the US and the UK are 
excluded, which renders 60% of the total sample. Here, the results are very much in line with those for 
the overall sample as depicted in Table 4 and we again find strong confirmation for H7, but less so for 
H6. Another interesting difference is that for Beta as the risk indicator, it clearly shows that more risk 
reduces environmental performance. Appendix B.3 shows the results when we exclude the US, which 
leaves us with about 70% of the original sample. These results are basically in line with those of the 
previous sensitivity analysis.
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Table 5 provides the estimation results of the pooled OLS regression for the different types of fossil 
fuel firms (chemicals, coal, oil and gas). It shows detailed information on how financial performance 
is associated with the environmental score. In general, the estimation results show that the relationship 
between environmental performance and financial performance differs among the three groups. The 
results suggest that being among the fossil fuel firms as such does not produce a straightforward 
impact on the overall environmental score. We find that only with oil and gas firms there is a 
significant and negative association between Tobin’s Q and environmental score. This confirms the 
opportunism hypothesis (H7) for oil and gas firms. This result also seems to suggest that the negative 
relationship detected in Table 4 between this variable and environmental score is due to firms in the 
oil and gas sector in particular. We establish a significant and positive relationship between excess 
stock returns for oil and gas firms, but not for chemical firms and coal firms. Hence, we can conclude 
that H6 is supported for oil and gas companies, but not for the others. Table 5 shows that for firms in 
the coal industry, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between return on equity and 
environmental score. This too hints at a trade-off between financial and environmental performance 
and confirms H7. As to business risk, there is a clear positive association between this risk indicator 
and environmental performance for coal firms as well as for firms in oil and gas, but not for chemical 
firms. This suggests that particularly the relatively risky firms have higher environmental scores. For 
Beta, we observe that belonging to the oil and gas sector implies a significant negative relationship 
between this financial market risk (business risk) and environmental score. There is no significant 
relationship between the Beta of a coal firm and this score, whereas there is a significant positive one 
between the Beta of a chemical firm and the environmental score. The controls, again, show a 
significant and positive association with the dependent variable, with leverage the exception.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
In Appendix C, we redo the estimations for Table 5 for three different subsamples. Appendix C.1 
reports the results for Australia, Canada, Japan, UK and US. It shows that there is no significant 
association between Tobin’s Q, excess returns and return on equity interacted with energy for any of 
the three subindustries. Hence, there is no support for the resources or opportunism hypotheses. As to 
risk, we find that there is a significant positive relationship between business risk and environmental 
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score for the coal firms, and marginally so for oil and gas companies. There is a marginally negative 
relationship with chemical firms in this respect. But for Beta, there is a positive association between 
risk and environmental score with chemicals. Appendix C.2 with the results for the sample excluding 
the UK and the US, as well Appendix C.3 excluding US only, render highly similar results to those in 
the main analysis reported in Table 5.
In Table 6, we report the last phase of the estimation, namely, the 3SLS estimation of our 
simultaneous equation system regarding the effect of fossil fuel on environmental performance, as 
well as that of environmental score on financial performance. This is motivated by the endogeneity of 
the relationship between environmental and financial performance, as is widely documented in the 
literature (see the reviews: Wu et al., 2006; Margolis et al., 2009). In all panels, we first have financial 
performance as the dependent variable and environmental performance as the independent variable in 
the upper half; this is reversed in the lower half of the panels.
Panel A in Table 6 shows the estimation results for all three fossil fuel-related industries combined, 
and panels B–D show those for chemical, coal, oil and gas firms, respectively. The overall results in 
Panel A suggest that environmental performance of fossil fuel firms 
(Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance) has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q, but no significant 
impact on return on equity. This lends support for the stakeholder hypothesis (H4) in the case of 
Tobin’s Q only. Further, environmental performance in fossil fuel firms significantly reduces excess 
returns and both risk measures, which is in support of the stakeholder hypothesis (H4). When financial 
performance is the independent variable, this shows that there is a statistically significant (<1%) and 
negative relationship with all financial variables, except return on equity and Beta 
(Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance). This is understood as follows: the estimated coefficient of 
Dummy_Fossil is positive and mostly significant, suggesting that fossil fuel firms are to be associated 
with relatively higher environmental scores. Financial performance also yields a positive and 
significant sign, except for ROE and Beta. This suggests that better financial performance is associated 
with better environmental performance. But the combination of the two yields a statistically significant 
and negative sign for again three proxies of financial performance. This implies that, for fossil fuel 
firms that perform relatively well from a financial perspective, there is a significant and negative 
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association with environmental score. This confirms the opportunism hypothesis (H7). For the two 
risk indicators, panel A in table 6 shows there is a negative and significant association with business 
risk but no relationship with market risk (i.e., Beta). This confirms the resources view (H6) for 
business risk only.
Panels B–D show the results for fossil fuel firms in the three groups, chemicals, coal, and oil and gas, 
respectively. In the discussion, we again focus on the interaction coefficients in the upper and lower 
half of the three panels. Panel B shows that with environmental performance as the independent 
variable, there is no statistical significance for the coefficient of the interaction term, suggesting that 
environmentally outperformance of chemical firms has no impact on financial performance for any of 
the five performance measures. With financial performance as the independent variable, the result is 
quite different. Financially outperforming chemical firms have a significant negative impact on 
Tobin’s Q, stock market returns, and return on equity. There is no significant relationship with the two 
financial risk measures. Again, this is supportive of the opportunism hypothesis (H7) which posits a 
negative relationship between financial and social performance.
Panel C shows the results for coal firms. These are quite similar to those in Panel B. However, there 
now is some marginal significance for the interaction coefficient when environmental performance is 
the independent variable regarding the Tobin’s Q and Beta. And with return on equity with coal firms, 
we find support for the trade-off hypothesis (H5) where social outperformance is negatively associated 
with financial performance. When we use financial performance as our independent, the firms in the 
coal industry show the same behavior as those in chemicals, and we confirm H7.
The results for firms in oil and gas (Panel D) are quite different from those for chemicals and coal. 
This panel shows that when environmental performance is the independent variable, there is a 
significant positive impact on Tobin’s Q (confirming the stakeholder view, H4), and a significant 
negative impact on excess stock market returns (confirming the trade-off view, H5) as well as on the 
two risk measures (again confirming the stakeholder view, H4). This suggests that environmentally 
outperforming firms in oil and gas have relatively higher value and lower stock market returns, as well 
as lower financial risk. Further, with financial performance as the independent variable and 
environmental performance as the dependent variable, panel C in table 6 shows that oil and gas firms 
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that perform well from the financial perspective have significantly lower Tobin’s Q and excess stock 
market returns. This is strong support for the opportunism hypothesis (H7). There is no significant 
relationship with return on equity. In addition, these firms are associated with less business risk 
(confirming H6), but not with systematic risk. In all cases, this panel shows that the effects of our 
controls are highly statistically significant.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Sensitivity analysis regarding the 3SLS estimations for the simultaneous equation system for the effect 
of the fossil fuel (sub)industries for geographic subsamples is reported in Appendix D. Appendix D.1 
has the results for the subsample of Australia, Canada, Japan, the UK and the US. The overall results 
are similar to those in Panel A of Table 6, but the panels B-D all reveal that better environmental 
performance significantly reduces Tobin’s Q with chemicals and coal, but it improves Tobin’s Q with 
oil and gas companies. Regarding the risk measures, the results of this sensitivity analysis in general as 
in the same direction as in the main analysis but significance is weaker. Appendix D.2 shows the 
results for our sample excluding the US and the UK. These findings are highly similar to those in the 
main analysis as reported in Table 6.
We establish that the fossil fuel firms in general outperform other firms regarding the overall 
environmental score. This seems to be based on these firms’ efforts to behave in a more responsible 
manner. However, we also establish that this especially results from outperformance by chemical 
firms. Firms in coal and in oil and gas significantly underperform firms in most other industries. If we 
investigate the relationship between financial and environmental performance for these three fossil 
fuel related sectors, we find that industry specifics is mainly of importance in the risk arena. Further, 
selection of the dependent and independent variables does matter. This is especially the case with the 
value and return indicators. If environmental performance is used as the independent variable, there is 
a significant positive relationship between environmentally outperforming firms in oil and gas and 
Tobin’s Q, and a negative one for these firms and excess stock market returns. This confirms the 
predictions from the theoretical model of Dam and Scholtens (2015). We also discover a negative 
association between environmental outperformance and market risk which especially is the case with 
oil and gas firms. With financial performance as the independent variable, we observe a statistically 
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significant and negative association with all three financial indicators in all three subindustries (apart 
from return on equity in oil and gas). Subindustry specifics, however, again clearly show up in the risk 
arena. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion
We study the performance of a large, international sample of companies that are highly intense 
regarding the use of fossil fuels with respect to several environmental dimensions of corporate social 
responsibility in the period 2002–2013. We relate their environmental performance to various 
measures of corporate financial performance. The fossil fuel firms are of particular interest as their 
social costs are substantially above their private costs: External effects are a major concern with these 
firms. In particular, the role of fossil fuels in climate change is a topic of intense interest and debate. 
This is one of the main reasons fossil fuel firms place great effort into improving their social and 
environmental policies and performance (Kolk et al., 2001; Heal, 2008). We investigate how 
environmental performance relates to fossil fuel firms’ financial performance. As to environmental 
performance, we use qualitative and quantitative information from Thomson Reuter’s ASSET4. For 
financial performance, we investigate different, mostly hitherto unexplored, financial indicators 
relating to stock market and accounting performance, namely, Tobin’s Q, excess stock returns, return 
on equity, business risk, and Beta (systematic risk). It shows that there is a lot of heterogeneity within 
our sample, both regarding indicators of environmental and financial performance.
We find that, in most instances, there is a strong and significant relationship between corporate 
environmental and financial performance of the fossil fuel firms. This especially concerns Tobin’s Q 
and return on equity. For excess stock market returns, there usually is no relationship or only a small 
negative effect. In general, we conclude that when firms do well regarding Tobin’s Q and return on 
equity, they also show high environmental scores. It should be remembered that these scores pertain to 
policies to a great extent. When we account for the fact that a firm operates in a particular fossil fuel-
related sector (chemicals, coal, or oil and gas), this characteristic plays a very crucial role. Operating 
in the fossil fuel-related industry as such appears to change the general relationship between 
environmental and financial performance: there no longer is a significant and positive relationship and, 
especially in the case of Tobin’s Q, there appears to be a statistically significant and negative 
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association. When we investigate a wide range of environmental performance indicators (e.g., 
emissions, water use, waste production, resource use) it shows that better financial performance 
implies more emissions. This suggests that there is a trade-off between Tobin’s Q and environmental 
performance with fossil fuel firms, reflecting the external effects of their production processes. In 
general, we infer that particularly financial outperformance matters. Environmental outperformance is 
not associated with Tobin’s Q, stock market returns, or return on equity with firms in chemicals and 
coal. However, with oil and gas firms, we find that environmental outperformance is significantly 
associated with Tobin’s Q and stock market returns. Furthermore, in oil and gas, both environmental 
and financial outperformance can be associated with lower risk.
We tested several hypothesis. We found support for the notion that fossil fuel firms have better 
policies (H1) but weaker actual performance (H2) than non-fossil ones. However, H2 is to be rejected 
for the chemical industry. We can also confirm our H3 which holds that environmental performance of 
firms in chemicals is better than that of firms in coal and in oil and gas, but only in a univariate setting. 
As to the relationship between financial and environmental performance, we found some support for 
the stakeholder theory (H4), especially in the risk dimension, which is well in line with the findings of 
Scholtens (2008). Furthermore, we find little support for the trade-off view (H5), which holds that 
social performance goes to the detriment of financial performance, apart from firms in coal. The same 
is the case with the resources hypothesis (H6), which assumes that financial performance has a 
positive impact on social performance. This especially seems to be the case for companies in oil and 
gas, where it shows that social performance significantly reduces the risk indicators (business risk and 
Beta). However, in most cases, we found that financial performance has a significant negative impact 
on social performance, as such confirming the opportunism hypothesis (H7). 
Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we convincingly show that risk 
management is an issue in oil and gas; this is in line with the theoretical notions of Bénabou and Tirole 
(2006, 2010). Secondly, we find that industry-specific issues are important, as discussed by Heal 
(2008) and are able to show in more detail how they are so. Further, we add to the literature on the 
relationship between finance and corporate social responsibility, as discussed by Wu et al. (2006) and 
Margolis et al. (2009), for a much broader range of environmental and financial indicators than has 
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been studied so far for firms in chemicals, coal, and oil and gas. Fourth, we illustrate the notions 
brought forward in the more theoretical studies of Gregory et al. (2014) and Dam and Scholtens 
(2015) via a case study of fossil fuel firms. Our study also complements the findings about the 
relationship between financial and environmental performance with energy firms, which thus far 
investigate mainly accidents (Patten and Nance, 1998; Capelle-Blancard and Laguna, 2009; Henriques 
and Sadorsky, 2010). Another novelty is that we show that the inclusion of financial risk sheds light 
on the relationship between environmental and financial performance, thus complementing Pätäri et al. 
(2014) and Arslan-Ayaydin and Thewissen (2015). Finally, we develop a broad international setting 
and perspective, as our data include more than 50 countries.
From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that environmental policies for fossil fuel firms need 
to account for industry-specifics, as a one size fits all approach is unlikely to achieve policy objectives. 
Policy design should be very careful as to what specific objective is targeted, given the complex 
relationship between environmental and financial performance in the fossil fuel-related sectors.
Limitations of our study include the quality of the environmental performance data, as these are not 
externally verified and validated. We regard this as an important drawback regarding scientific 
research in this area and very much welcome initiatives to overcome this problem. Further, there is a 
bias in our study toward observations from richer countries. Although we include many more 
observations from developing countries than is the case in previous studies, we would like to 
investigate whether the relationships differ among subgroups of countries as well. Our sensitivity 
analyses show that there in some instances sample composition has an impact on the conclusions. 
Regarding the methodology, we rely on a 3SLS approach that is subject to some weaknesses. In 
particular, finding the best instruments that impact environmental (financial) performance, but not 
financial (environmental) performance, is very difficult. Even though there may be validity arguments 
against our model and instruments, they are consistent with those used in the literature.
We conclude that efforts of fossil fuel firms do not appear sufficient to improve environmental 
performance and that there are both trade-offs and synergies between environmental and financial 
performance, which can differ along the various indicators and which are highly industry-specific.
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1Table 1: Sample countries and mean values of environmental score
The environmental score is performance pillar reflecting how well a company uses best management practices to 
avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities to generate long-term shareholder 
value. The sample period is from January 2002 to December 2013.
Country Total Sample Non-fossil fuel firms Fossil fuel firms
N Mean N Mean N Mean
Australia 1,342 35.9975 1,153 35.5700 189 38.6055
Austria 122 64.3275 110 61.3128 12 91.9617
Belgium 187 58.2609 175 55.9731 12 91.6242
Brazil 233 53.6554 209 51.6938 24 70.7375
Canada 1,540 38.6769 1,084 38.5328 456 39.0192
Chile 56 40.7763 51 38.9865 5 59.0320
China 278 32.8192 242 30.5463 36 48.0978
Colombia 12 46.7025 12 46.7025
Czech Republic 5 37.0960 5 37.0960
Denmark 206 59.8168 206 59.8168
Egypt 29 23.1238 29 23.1238
Finland 244 75.6037 230 74.6953 14 90.5271
France 747 76.2579 656 76.1179 91 77.2674
Germany 634 68.1313 590 66.9240 44 84.3189
Greece 142 42.1356 120 36.5048 22 72.8486
Hong Kong 472 32.1517 445 31.7184 27 39.2926
Hungary 15 74.9047 9 64.3589 6 90.7233
India 251 59.3308 220 57.7815 31 70.3258
Indonesia 91 49.2776 74 48.0028 17 54.8265
Ireland 143 39.6181 137 40.3483 6 22.9467
Israel 60 37.9598 52 31.2910 8 81.3075
Italy 258 51.9221 240 49.0643 18 90.0256
Japan 3,175 63.2768 2,881 62.0711 294 75.0915
Kuwait 6 53.4583 6 53.4583
Luxembourg 44 55.7146 35 61.2540 9 34.1722
Malaysia 115 41.6329 115 41.6329
Mexico 113 49.1227 113 49.1227
Morocco 6 37.8750 6 37.8750
Netherlands 294 67.9912 254 65.8918 40 81.3225
New Zealand 65 46.5683 65 46.5683
Norway 166 62.9472 97 63.5037 69 62.1648
Peru 9 25.1511 9 25.1511
Philippines 30 27.6917 30 27.6917
Poland 39 37.6139 31 34.6958 8 48.9213
Portugal 77 71.3199 69 69.8606 8 83.9063
Qatar 6 11.3967 6 11.3967
Russia 150 42.5271 101 33.0134 49 62.1369
Saudi Arabia 24 37.1158 11 20.2682 13 51.3715
Singapore 243 38.5595 238 38.8283 5 25.7620
South Africa 280 53.3428 266 52.8638 14 62.4443
South Korea 353 64.8985 320 63.6606 33 76.9024
Spain 285 70.3932 260 69.6515 25 78.1064
Sri Lanka 4 54.3050 4 54.3050
Sweden 419 70.1715 402 71.9627 17 27.8147
Switzerland 484 59.8851 421 58.3516 63 70.1330
Taiwan 448 47.0445 401 48.3051 47 36.2892
Thailand 65 54.7940 30 33.1753 35 73.3243
Turkey 69 55.0149 63 51.9338 6 87.3667
United Arab Emirates 11 36.0527 11 36.0527
United Kingdom 2,421 60.3072 2,245 60.9396 176 52.2393
United States 6,839 43.8841 6,029 43.5652 810 46.2578
Total 23,307 51.9057 20,568 51.6076 2,739 54.1437
2Table 2: Descriptive statistics for financial performance and environmental score by industry
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of (book value of total assets + market value of common equity − book value of common equity) to book value of total assets. Excess stock return is 
the annual buy and hold return in excess of local market return. Return on equity is the ratio of net income to the book value of common equity. Business risk is the 
standard deviation of operating income ratio over 3-year overlapping periods in the sample period. Annual beta is calculated using monthly stock return data in each year 
by running regressions for the firm stock return against local market index returns for each firm. Total beta is calculated using monthly stock return data for the entire 
sample period by running regressions for firm stock return against local market index returns for each firm. The environmental score is a performance pillar reflecting how 
well a company uses best management practices to avoid environmental risks and to capitalize on environmental opportunities to generate long-term shareholder value. The 
sample period is 2002 to 2013.
Tobin's Q Excess Stock Return Return on Equity Business Risk Beta Environ. Score
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
Non-fossil fuel firms
Agriculture 79 1.6643 79 0.0552 79 0.1464 79 0.0357 79 0.8363 79 33.031
Aircraft 180 1.5674 178 0.1179 180 0.2321 180 0.0157 180 0.9889 180 69.170
Apparel 211 2.0245 208 0.1189 211 0.1329 210 0.0143 210 0.9460 211 49.394
Automobiles and Trucks 699 1.3688 697 0.1790 699 0.1161 696 0.0404 697 1.1394 699 78.258
Beer & Liquor 219 1.6071 219 0.0978 219 0.1506 219 0.0140 219 0.7500 219 57.737
Business Services 1,491 2.0955 1475 0.1001 1,502 0.1589 1,486 0.0850 1,490 0.9744 1,502 38.583
Business Supplies 299 1.4327 298 0.0810 299 0.1124 299 0.0198 299 0.9441 299 69.937
Candy & Soda 228 1.9275 226 0.1118 228 0.2347 228 0.0114 228 0.6784 228 55.405
Communication 1,384 1.7757 1358 0.0610 1,389 0.1662 1,381 0.0933 1,375 0.8750 1,389 44.880
Computer Hardware 383 1.8626 381 0.0733 383 0.0888 383 0.0235 383 1.0981 383 70.517
Computer Software 856 2.9136 851 0.1111 855 0.1379 856 0.0507 857 1.0055 857 34.730
Construction 876 1.2617 873 0.0908 876 0.0776 875 0.0315 876 1.0651 876 58.449
Construction Materials 630 1.4811 630 0.0861 630 0.0627 630 0.0982 630 1.0905 630 63.605
Consumer Goods 517 2.6658 516 0.1025 517 0.2202 517 0.0166 516 0.8973 517 67.128
Defense 5 1.4011 5 -0.0106 5 0.2534 5 0.0042 5 0.8373 5 30.292
Electrical Equipment 228 1.5341 227 0.0873 228 0.0605 228 0.0205 228 1.0929 228 67.946
Electronic Equipment 1,309 1.9417 1298 0.0530 1,308 0.0239 1,309 0.0833 1,308 1.2012 1,309 59.425
Entertainment 306 2.2008 300 0.1138 308 0.0869 307 0.0383 305 0.9357 308 28.840
Fabricated Products 72 1.5109 66 0.1508 73 0.0639 73 0.0361 67 1.1883 73 57.364
Food Products 619 1.7248 616 0.0727 620 0.1395 619 0.0144 619 0.7164 620 56.278
Healthcare 197 1.7174 197 0.1065 197 0.1289 197 0.0173 197 0.7306 197 27.828
Machinery 900 1.7697 897 0.1659 902 0.1466 900 0.0274 901 1.1700 903 64.747
Measuring and Control Equipment 233 2.1857 233 0.1132 233 0.1440 233 0.0331 233 1.1128 233 48.798
3Table 2 continued
Tobin's Q Excess Stock Return Return on Equity Business Risk Beta Environ.  Score
N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean
Medical Equipment 418 3.2021 416 0.0816 423 0.1919 423 0.0177 418 0.8117 423 49.553
Non-Metallic and Industrial Meta 702 2.1676 697 0.2106 705 0.0386 597 0.3924 702 1.4070 705 45.470
Personal Services 204 2.2423 201 0.0765 204 0.1285 203 0.0300 204 0.9173 204 26.311
Pharmaceutical Products 879 2.5879 876 0.0774 881 0.0861 878 0.2438 880 0.7893 882 49.909
Precious Metals 462 2.4333 461 0.1133 462 -0.0204 363 0.3770 462 1.2573 462 32.107
Printing and Publishing 323 1.9350 320 0.0048 324 0.1290 303 0.0185 322 0.8774 324 43.349
Recreation 208 1.5046 208 0.0714 208 0.0373 207 0.0260 208 1.0453 208 66.351
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 380 2.1069 375 0.1443 380 0.0952 380 0.0776 379 0.9808 380 48.873
Retail 1,540 2.0246 1531 0.1164 1,543 0.1619 1,540 0.0145 1,535 0.9159 1,543 43.287
Rubber and Plastic Products 101 1.6721 101 0.1399 101 0.1107 101 0.0158 101 0.9966 101 61.635
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 87 1.4110 87 0.1620 87 0.1392 87 0.0237 87 1.2582 87 59.791
Shipping Containers 117 1.3060 117 0.1085 117 0.0430 117 0.0134 117 1.0639 117 64.365
Steel Works, etc. 628 1.3697 626 0.1252 630 0.0912 630 0.0389 628 1.2665 630 59.871
Textiles 49 1.2028 49 0.1310 49 0.0720 49 0.0332 49 1.1609 49 50.132
Tobacco Products 97 3.7023 96 0.1228 97 0.3718 97 0.0200 97 0.6418 97 63.414
Transportation 1,187 1.3959 1178 0.0864 1,196 0.0767 1,192 0.0356 1,186 0.9398 1,196 53.170
Wholesale 1,131 1.7780 1121 0.1080 1,133 0.1001 1,133 0.0312 1,128 0.9761 1,134 47.115
Others 81 1.9977 80 0.0324 81 0.1233 80 0.0747 81 0.8765 81 32.003
Non-fossil fuel firms 20,515 1.9272 20,368 0.1024 20,562 0.1147 20,290 0.0693 20,486 1.0032 20,568 51.608
Fossil fuel firms
Chemicals 964 1.5987 961 0.1204 966 0.1191 962 0.0295 965 1.0610 966 68.740
Coal 145 1.9615 144 0.0790 145 0.1161 142 0.3305 145 1.2824 145 39.074
Oil and Gas 1,627 1.6383 1615 0.1205 1,627 0.1083 1,598 0.1587 1,626 1.1611 1,628 46.825
Total 2,736 1.6414 2,720 0.1183 2,738 0.1125 2,702 0.1217 2,736 1.1322 2,739 54.144
4Table 3: Comparisons of financial performance and environmental scores between non-fossil and fossil fuel firms
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of (book value of total assets + market value of common equity − book value of common equity) to the book value of total assets. Excess stock 
return is the annual buy and hold return in excess of local market return. Return on equity is the ratio of net income to book value of common equity. Business risk is the 
standard deviation of operating income ratio over 3-year overlapping periods in the sample period. Annual beta is calculated using monthly stock return data in each 
year by running regressions for firm stock return against local market index returns for each firm. Total beta is calculated using monthly stock return data in the entire 
sample period by running regressions for firm stock return against local market index returns for each firm. Assets is measured by the US dollar value of the book value 
of total assets; leverage is the ratio of total book value of short and long-term debt to the book value of total assets, R&D is research and development expenditures; and 
net working capital is the ratio of the difference between current assets and current liabilities to the book value of total assets. Environmental performance scores are 
examined as categorical scores and indicators, which are items determining categorical scores for emission reduction, product innovation, and resource reduction. The 
significance of differences between means and medians is based on a t-test for mean differences and Wilcoxon rank-sum test for median differences, and ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. 
Panel A: Financial performance and firm characteristics
Total sample Non-fossil fuel firms Fossil fuel firms Difference Non-fossil and fossil
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Tobin's Q 23,251 1.8936 1.4612 20,515 1.9272 1.4750 2,736 1.6414 1.3830 0.2858*** 0.0921***
Excess Stock Return 23,088 0.1043 0.0411 20,368 0.1024 0.0401 2,720 0.1183 0.0522 -0.0159* -0.0121*
Return on Equity 23,300 0.1144 0.1205 20,562 0.1147 0.1207 2,738 0.1125 0.1194 0.0021 0.0013
Business Risk 22,992 0.0754 0.0165 20,290 0.069 0.016 2,702 0.1217 0.0255 -0.052*** -0.010***
Beta 23,222 1.0184 0.9831 20,486 1.0032 0.9647 2,736 1.1322 1.1051 -0.1290*** -0.1405***
Assets (USD billion) 23,306 12.300 4.444 20,567 11.,700 4.305 2,739 17.600 5.784 -5.900*** -1.479***
Leverage 23,263 0.3477 0.3378 20,534 0.3487 0.3379 2,729 0.3406 0.3373 0.0081* 0.0006
R&D 23,307 0.0186 0.0000 20,568 0.0199 0.0001 2,739 0.0088 0.0000 0.0111*** 0.0001***
NetWorkingCapital 23,189 0.1445 0.1217 20,450 0.1496 0.1282 2,739 0.1067 0.0841 0.0429*** 0.0441***
Panel B: Environmental categorical scores
Total sample Non-fossil fuel firms Fossil fuel firms Difference Non-fossil and fossil
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Environmental Score 23,307 51.9057 50.9000 20,568 51.6076 50.2300 2,739 54.1437 57.0600 -2.5361*** -6.8300***
Emission Reduction 23,307 51.8969 51.4700 20,568 51.0018 49.3400 2,739 58.6182 66.7100 -7.6164*** -17.3700***
Product Innovation 23,307 49.6024 34.9400 20,568 49.6976 35.1600 2,739 48.8873 32.9400 0.8103 2.2200
Resource Reduction 23,307 52.0223 53.0000 20,568 52.0777 52.8000 2,739 51.6060 54.0300 0.4717 -1.2300
5Table 3 continued
Panel C: Financial performance and firm characteristics of fossil fuel firms
Chemicals Coal Oil and gas Chemicals minus Oil and gas
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Tobin's Q 964 1.5987 1.4183 145 1.9615 1.5125 1,627 1.6383 1.3544 -0.066 0.056**
Excess Stock Return 961 0.1204 0.0672 144 0.0790 -0.0957 1615 0.1205 0.0457 0.003 0.030**
Return on Equity 966 0.1191 0.1193 145 0.1161 0.1178 1,627 0.1083 0.1199 0.010 0.000*
Business Risk 962 0.0295 0.0175 142 0.3305 0.0503 1,598 0.1587 0.0348 -0.143*** -0.019***
Beta 965 1.0610 1.0402 145 1.2824 1.2492 1,626 1.1611 1.1425 -0.110*** -0.106***
Assets (USD billion) 966 10.000 5.802 145 6.110 2.819 1,628 23.000 6.298 -11.700*** 0.807***
Leverage 959 0.4050 0.4064 145 0.3096 0.3210 1,625 0.3054 0.3020 0.0993*** 0.1043***
R&D 966 0.0223 0.0175 145 0.0001 0.0000 1,628 0.0015 0.0000 0.0208*** 0.0175***
NetWorkingCapital 966 0.1598 0.1496 145 0.1340 0.0848 1,628 0.0728 0.0481 0.0820*** 0.0994***
Panel D: Environmental categorical scores of fossil fuel fims
Chemicals Coal Oil and gas Chemicals minus Oil and gas
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Environmental Score 966 68.7402 83.6300 145 39.0740 33.2800 1,628 46.8249 39.2750 22.5492*** 45.1500***
Emission Reduction 966 66.5729 79.0300 145 51.7721 49.9900 1,628 54.5079 58.1300 12.2887*** 21.5400***
Product Innovation 966 67.9836 79.9350 145 26.4548 19.7000 1,628 39.5541 24.9700 29.5008*** 54.9650***
Resource Reduction 966 62.9757 72.4600 145 41.2369 34.9900 1,628 45.7831 35.8150 17.5644*** 36.6800***
6Table 3 continued
Panel E: Environmental indicators
Total sample Non-fossil fuel firms Fossil fuel firms
Difference Non-fossil and 
fossil
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Emission Reduction 
[Policy] 23,307 53.3506 48.4100 20,568 52.3045 48.4100 2,739 61.2094 85.0800 -8.9049*** -36.6700***
Emission Reduction
[Implementation] 23,307 50.6347 55.4800 20,568 49.7989 55.4800 2,739 56.9141 58.3000 -7.1152*** -2.8200***
Emission Reduction
[Monitoring] 23,307 47.5979 35.5200 20,568 47.0520 35.5200 2,739 51.6989 35.5200 -4.6469*** 0.0000***
CO2 Equivalents Emission 
Total / USD Total Assets 9,872 0.2051 0.0509 8,528 0.1690 0.0412 1,344 0.4343 0.3141 -0.2653*** -0.2729***
CO2 Equivalents Emission 
Direct / USD Total Assets 7,192 0.1547 0.0189 6,230 0.1245 0.0135 962 0.3501 0.2464 -0.2256*** -0.2330***
CO2 Equivalents Emission 
Indirect / USD Total Assets 6,553 0.0555 0.0212 5,769 0.0515 0.0195 784 0.0855 0.0431 -0.0340*** -0.0235***
NOx Emissions /
USD Total Assets 3,789 0.0010 0.0001 2,829 0.0011 0.0000 960 0.0007 0.0004 0.0004*** -0.0004***
SOx Emissions /
USD Total Assets 3,643 0.0010 0.0001 2,662 0.0010 0.0000 981 0.0007 0.0003 0.0003*** -0.0003***
VOC Emissions /
USD Total Assets 2,232 0.0002 0.0000 1,586 0.0001 0.0000 646 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0004*** -0.0002***
Waste Total /
USD Total Assets 6,602 0.5978 0.0056 5,718 0.6684 0.0052 884 0.1413 0.0088 0.5271*** -0.0036***
Non-Hazardous Waste / 
USD Total Assets 3,129 0.7164 0.0043 2,604 0.8402 0.0042 525 0.1024 0.0048 0.7378*** -0.0006
Waste Recycled Total / 
USD Total Assets 5,064 0.0277 0.0033 4,501 0.0291 0.0033 563 0.0163 0.0028 0.0128*** 0.0005
Hazardous Waste /
USD Total Assets 3,422 0.0218 0.0004 2,790 0.0238 0.0003 632 0.0126 0.0022 0.0113* -0.0019***
Water Discharged /
USD Total Assets 2,980 4.0505 0.5837 2,469 3.4825 0.4642 511 6.7948 1.4607 -3.3123*** -0.9965***
Water Pollutant Emissions / 
USD Total Assets 2,098 0.0022 0.0000 1,517 0.0017 0.0000 581 0.0034 0.0001 -0.0017*** -0.0001***
Chemical Oxygen Demand 
COD Effluents in Discharge 
/ USD Total Assets 1,695 0.0005 0.0000 1,245 0.0005 0.0000 450 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003*** -0.0001***
7Table 3 continued
Total sample Non-fossil fuel firms Fossil fuel firms
Difference Non-fossil and 
fossil
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Environmental Expenditures 
/ USD Total Assets 4,750 0.6401% 0.2826% 3,748 0.5495% 0.2389% 1,002 0.9790% 0.5721% -0.4295%*** -0.3333%***
Environmental Provisions / 
USD Total Assets 2,606 1.0930% 0.4008% 2,003 0.9070% 0.3399% 603 1.7109% 0.7382% -0.8040%*** -0.3983%***
Emission Reduction [
CO2 Reduction] 23,307 46.9714 29.2200 20,568 45.6681 29.2200 2,739 56.7625 34.9600 -11.0944*** -5.7400***
Emission Reduction
[F-Gases Emissions] 22,010 43.5171 39.7400 19,274 43.5585 39.7400 2,736 43.2254 39.7400 0.3331 0.0000**
Emission Reduction
[Ozone-Depleting 
Substances Reduction] 23,307 44.3920 37.0300 20,568 44.3624 37.0300 2,739 44.6145 37.0300 -0.2521 0.0000
Emission Reduction
[NOx and SOx Emissions 
Reduction] 22,010 42.5441 32.8400 19,274 41.1025 32.8400 2,736 52.6997 33.0900 -11.5972*** -0.2500***
Emission Reduction
[VOC Emissions 
Reduction] 22,010 44.0481 32.6200 19,274 43.3663 32.6200 2,736 48.8511 34.2200 -5.4848*** -1.6000***
Emission Reduction
[Innovative Production] 23,307 45.6009 31.4300 20,568 44.3210 31.4300 2,739 55.2160 38.2100 -10.8950*** -6.7800***
Product Produced Total / 
USD Total Assets 2,849 6.6104 0.5536 1,835 2.0636 0.3217 1,014 14.8386 0.8315 -12.7750*** -0.5099***
Resource Reduction
[Policy] 23,307 53.6133 56.5600 20,568 53.8370 56.5600 2,739 51.9328 43.7200 1.9042** 12.8400***
Resource Reduction
[Improvements] 23,307 44.7784 40.5900 20,568 44.9843 40.5900 2,739 43.2319 40.5900 1.7524*** 0.0000***
Energy Use Total /
USD Total Assets 7,952 2.9274 0.5656 6,920 2.4557 0.4454 1,032 6.0902 3.9078 -3.6344*** -3.4623***
Direct Energy Purchased / 
USD Total Assets 7,517 2.7634 0.5041 6,665 2.3842 0.4128 852 5.7299 3.4461 -3.3458*** -3.0333***
Electricity Purchased /
USD Total Assets 6,430 0.4487 0.1675 5,835 0.4164 0.1609 595 0.7657 0.2960 -0.3493*** -0.1350***
8Table 3 continued
Panel F: Environmental indicators of fossil fuel firms
Chemicals Coal Oil and gas Chemicals minus Oil and gas
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Emission Reduction
[Policy]] 966 67.1617 85.0800 145 57.4588 48.4100 1,628 58.0115 62.9400 9.1954*** 22.1400***
Emission Reduction
[Implementation] 966 59.7083 58.3300 145 58.7866 58.3000 1,628 55.0893 58.3000 4.3166*** 0.0300***
Emission Reduction/ 
[Monitoring] 966 63.2697 90.2400 145 39.5610 27.7400 1,628 45.9142 32.6200 17.8751*** 57.6200***
CO2 Equivalents Emission 
Total / USD Total Assets 608 0.4930 0.3368 37 0.3800 0.2063 699 0.3860 0.3070 0.1074*** 0.0319**
CO2 Equivalents Emission 
Direct / USD Total Assets 401 0.3944 0.2402 26 0.3648 0.1815 535 0.3162 0.2573 0.0759*** -0.0140
CO2 Equivalents Emission 
Indirect / USD Total Assets 324 0.1434 0.1007 25 0.1346 0.0377 435 0.0395 0.0198 0.0987*** 0.0791***
NOx Emissions /
USD Total Assets 459 0.0006 0.0002 11 0.0009 0.0000 490 0.0008 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0003***
SOx Emissions /
USD Total Assets 458 0.0006 0.0001 13 0.0004 0.0000 510 0.0008 0.0004 -0.0002* -0.0003***
VOC Emissions /
USD Total Assets 312 0.0003 0.0001 3 0.0001 0.0001 331 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0004*** -0.0004***
Waste Total /
USD Total Assets 478 0.2250 0.0168 11 0.2583 0.0017 395 0.0367 0.0052 0.1823*** 0.0116***
Non-Hazardous Waste / 
USD Total Assets 230 0.2115 0.0127 9 0.1884 0.0006 286 0.0120 0.0034 0.1941*** 0.0093***
Waste Recycled Total / 
USD Total Assets 295 0.0229 0.0050 14 0.0568 0.0011 254 0.0063 0.0018 0.0139** 0.0033***
Hazardous Waste /
USD Total Assets 289 0.0203 0.0050 14 0.0403 0.0005 329 0.0047 0.0016 0.0141*** 0.0034***
Water Discharged /
USD Total Assets 242 11.7423 6.0252 12 21.4154 2.1292 257 1.4534 0.6526 9.3984*** 5.3231***
Water Pollutant Emissions / 
USD Total Assets 350 0.0050 0.0003 4 0.0001 0.0001 227 0.0009 0.0000 0.0041*** 0.0002***
Chemical Oxygen Demand 
COD Effluents in Discharge 
/ USD Total Assets 313 0.0003 0.0001 4 0.0001 0.0001 133 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0001***
9Table 3 continued
Chemicals Coal Oil and gas Chemicals minus Oil and gas
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Environmental Expenditures 
/ USD Total Assets 499 0.8891% 0.6189% 44 1.0106% 0.2858% 459 1.0738% 0.5528% -0.1792%*** 0.0783%
Environmental Provisions / 
USD Total Assets 298 1.7062% 0.9552% 40 2.4612% 1.3961% 265 1.6030% 0.5459% -0.0093% 0.3749%***
Emission Reduction
[CO2 Reduction] 966 61.4808 38.4400 145 54.6379 29.2200 1,628 54.1521 33.8500 7.2890*** 4.5900***
Emission Reduction
[F-Gases Emissions] 966 45.0632 39.7400 145 41.5239 39.6400 1,625 42.2847 39.6400 2.8408*** 0.1000***
Emission Reduction
[Ozone-Depleting 
Substances Reduction] 966 49.2118 37.0900 145 40.6003 36.9500 1,628 42.2441 36.9500 7.1022*** 0.1400***
Emission Reduction
[NOx and SOx Emissions 
Reduction] 966 53.5741 36.6900 145 45.3903 32.6900 1,625 52.8321 33.0900 1.3516 3.6000***
Emission Reduction
[VOC Emissions 
Reduction] 966 54.3232 37.5300 145 40.2310 32.1200 1,625 46.3674 32.6200 8.4585*** 4.9100***
Emission Reduction
[Innovative Production] 966 56.8928 39.0000 145 45.1532 30.3500 1,628 55.1173 38.2100 2.5904** 0.7900***
Product Produced Total / 
USD Total Assets 204 2.6387 0.6221 67 11.1494 7.0709 743 18.5209 0.8168 -15.2725*** -0.2641***
Resource Reduction
[Policy] 966 63.6597 82.2100 145 39.7488 40.6000 1,628 46.0597 42.6600 18.1162*** 39.5500***
Resource Reduction
[Improvements] 966 45.0434 41.2300 145 40.9323 40.4000 1,628 42.3618 40.5900 2.7985*** 0.6400***
Energy Use Total /
USD Total Assets 532 6.9997 4.2786 30 3.5864 1.6136 470 5.2204 3.4779 1.8774*** 0.9649***
Direct Energy Purchased / 
USD Total Assets 496 6.8652 4.0497 22 2.7327 1.6136 334 4.2415 2.3405 2.7169*** 1.7947***
Electricity Purchased /
USD Total Assets 291 1.0888 0.5680 12 0.5479 0.1942 292 0.4526 0.1453 0.6325*** 0.4178***
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Table 4: Regression analysis for environmental categories
This table reports pooled OLS regression results for the relationship between fossil fuel firms 
(Dummy_Fossil) and environmental performance score and its three categories, which are items 
determining categorical scores for emission reduction, product innovation, and resource reduction. 
The definitions of variables are given in Table 3. All regressions control country and year fixed 
effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are 
clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels.
Dependent Variables: Environmental performance scores
Variables Environment Emission Product Resource
Dummy_Fossil 8.708** 10.642*** 9.323** 2.925
[4.003] [3.544] [4.004] [4.183]   
Tobin’s Q 0.669*** 0.592** 0.429* 0.911***
[0.246] [0.239] [0.260] [0.237]   
Dummy_Fossil*Tobin’s Q -1.713*** -1.465** -1.591** -1.177
[0.642] [0.665] [0.682] [0.716]   
Excess Stock Return -0.859** -1.232*** 0.083 -1.242***
[0.384] [0.391] [0.411] [0.391]   
Dummy_Fossil*Excess Stock 
Return 2.051** 1.132 1.565 2.638** 
[0.966] [1.026] [1.006] [1.081]   
Return on Equity 1.870*** 1.721*** 1.613*** 1.781***
[0.446] [0.418] [0.447] [0.429]   
Dummy_Fossil*Return on 
Equity 0.685 0.598 1.671 -0.27
[1.500] [1.313] [1.739] [1.341]   
Business Risk -1.301*** -0.632 -1.512*** -1.263***
[0.438] [0.419] [0.383] [0.451]   
Dummy_Fossil*Business 
Risk 0.686 -0.737 2.162*** 0.785
[0.704] [0.661] [0.809] [0.771]   
Beta 3.080*** 2.234** 4.404*** 1.880*  
[1.022] [0.997] [1.014] [0.994]   
Dummy_Fossil* Beta -2.798 -0.816 -5.717* -1.4
 [3.284] [2.889] [3.163] [3.319]   
Size 14.065*** 14.071*** 10.126*** 13.687***
[0.381] [0.380] [0.383] [0.382]   
Leverage -0.137 -1.898 2.66 -1.658
[1.892] [1.844] [1.874] [1.883]   
R&D 113.806*** 87.562*** 134.501*** 93.367***
[12.669] [11.794] [12.630] [12.869]   
NetWorkingCapital 9.203*** 5.867** 12.508*** 6.336***
[2.288] [2.292] [2.310] [2.321]   
Constant -172.283*** -165.543*** -122.436*** -163.791***
[5.707] [5.813] [5.705] [5.697]   
Adjusted R2 0.375 0.362 0.274 0.333
Observations 22,636 22,636 22,636 22,636
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Table 5: Regression analysis for environmental score of fossil fuel firms
This table reports pooled OLS regression results for the relationship between fossil fuel firms in chemicals, coal, 
and gas and oil (Dummy_Fossil) and environmental score, separately. Definitions of variables are given in Table 3. 
All regressions control country and year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. Robust standard 
errors presented in brackets are clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Chemicals Coal Oil and gas
Dummy_Fossil 4.853 2.019 12.325***
[5.740]   [11.571]   [4.761]   
Tobin’s Q 0.653*** 0.683*** 0.712***
[0.245]   [0.247]   [0.246]   
Dummy_Fossil*Tobin’s Q -0.489 -0.299 -2.092***
[1.391]   [1.080]   [0.773]   
Excess Stock Return -0.884** -0.917** -0.945** 
[0.381]   [0.381]   [0.382]   
Dummy_Fossil*Excess 
Stock Return -0.046 1.134 2.473** 
[2.064]   [2.761]   [1.149]   
Return on Equity 1.854*** 1.868*** 1.848***
[0.442]   [0.442]   [0.445]   
Dummy_Fossil*Return on 
Equity 2.079 -3.340** 1.286
[1.671]   [1.461]   [2.512]   
Business Risk -1.289*** -1.252*** -1.290***
[0.435]   [0.436]   [0.435]   
Dummy_Fossil*Business 
Risk -7.527 2.743*** 1.677** 
[5.992]   [0.757]   [0.673]   
Beta 2.891*** 2.943*** 3.169***
[1.023]   [1.024]   [1.021]   
Dummy_Fossil* Beta 8.181** -1.68 -11.401***
 [4.017]   [6.886]   [3.609]   
Size 13.967*** 14.007*** 14.210***
[0.395]   [0.401]   [0.391]   
Leverage -1.185 -1.439 -1.91
[1.974]   [2.004]   [1.931]   
R&D 107.499*** 105.205*** 107.759***
[12.522]   [12.708]   [12.678]   
NetWorkingCapital 7.449*** 8.014*** 8.264***
[2.410]   [2.423]   [2.312]   
Constant -171.047*** -172.201*** -173.487***
[5.935]   [6.000]   [5.838]   
Adjusted R2 0.374 0.37 0.379
Observations 20,910 20,100 21,544
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Table 6: Structure regression analysis for environmental score of fossil fuel firms
This table reports 3SLS estimation for simultaneous equation system for the relationship between fossil fuel firms 
(Dummy_Fossil) and environmental performance, and the effect of environmental score on financial performance. 
Definitions of variables are given in Table 3. All regressions control country and year fixed effects. The sample period is 
from 2002 to 2013. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A: All three fossil fuel firms combined
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Excess Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.324*** 0.038** -0.004 0.152*** 0.233***
[0.059]   [0.019]   [0.022]   [0.024]   [0.014]   
Environmental Performance 0.00 0.001** 0.001*** 0.00 0.001***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
DummyFossil*EnvironmentalPerformance. 0.003*** 0.00 0.00 -0.002*** -0.002***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Size -0.415*** -0.034*** -0.006 -0.063*** 0.007** 
[0.012]   [0.004]   [0.004]   [0.005]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.400*** -0.006 -0.112*** 0.069*** 0.118***
[0.045]   [0.015]   [0.017]   [0.018]   [0.011]   
R&D 4.751*** -0.358*** -0.694*** 1.119*** 0.168***
[0.259]   [0.084]   [0.096]   [0.104]   [0.063]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.267*** 0.095*** -0.056** 0.049** 0.280***
[0.061]   [0.020]   [0.022]   [0.025]   [0.015]   
Constant 7.958*** 0.556*** 0.137** 1.279*** 0.665***
[0.165]   [0.053]   [0.061]   [0.067]   [0.040]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 23.794*** 10.717*** 0.008 5.182*** 0.497
[2.331]   [2.423]   [0.753]   [1.459]   [2.912]   
Financial Performance 19.821*** 119.25*** 8.807 96.408*** -1.201
[1.605]   [21.977]   [5.835]   [15.574]   [2.826]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -13.111*** -111.93*** -6.999 -92.92*** -1.031
[1.223]   [20.737]   [5.782]   [15.023]   [2.805]   
Size 15.062*** 10.185*** 6.558*** 11.072*** 6.505***
[0.725]   [0.766]   [0.132]   [0.814]   [0.123]   
R&D -65.194*** 61.770*** 46.122*** -66.55*** 40.986***
[10.298]   [10.365]   [4.840]   [19.645]   [3.584]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) 0.117** 0.200** 0.363*** 0.569*** 0.377***
[0.053]   [0.089]   [0.030]   [0.084]   [0.028]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.873*** 0.849*** 0.868*** 0.889*** 0.873***
[0.011]   [0.019]   [0.007]   [0.018]   [0.007]   
Constant -260.46*** -164.70*** -108.5*** -207.9*** -106.95***
[12.804]   [11.901]   [2.024]   [17.030]   [2.974]   
                                                
Observations 23,102 22,937 23,151 22,844 23,070
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Table 6 continued
Panel B: Chemicals
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Excess Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.320** 0.01 0.059 -0.065 0.017
[0.125]   [0.039]   [0.047]   [0.046]   [0.030]   
Environmental Performance 0 0 0.001*** 0 0.001***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance 0.002 0 -0.001 0 0.000
[0.002]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.000]   
Size -0.433*** -0.030*** -0.008*  -0.053*** 0.005*  
[0.012]   [0.004]   [0.005]   [0.005]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.386*** -0.004 -0.119*** 0.090*** 0.127***
[0.048]   [0.015]   [0.018]   [0.017]   [0.011]   
R&D 4.724*** -0.324*** -0.707*** 1.132*** 0.181***
[0.265]   [0.083]   [0.099]   [0.097]   [0.064]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.239*** 0.095*** -0.069*** 0.085*** 0.299***
[0.064]   [0.020]   [0.024]   [0.023]   [0.015]   
Constant 8.222*** 0.510*** 0.168*** 1.054*** 0.700***
[0.175]   [0.055]   [0.065]   [0.065]   [0.042]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 12.769*** 6.198*** 3.251*** 1.462** -0.554
[2.362]   [1.609]   [0.995]   [0.742]   [3.407]   
Financial Performance 10.499*** 56.995*** 20.293*** 4.466 0.134
[1.414]   [13.506]   [6.147]   [6.414]   [2.791]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -5.877*** -53.151*** -18.260*** -4.801 1.688
[1.274]   [12.720]   [6.320]   [7.492]   [3.237]   
Size 11.116*** 8.136*** 6.384*** 6.477*** 6.220***
[0.679]   [0.501]   [0.153]   [0.363]   [0.129]   
R&D -17.246** 48.490*** 50.252*** 32.659*** 37.710***
[8.481]   [6.143]   [5.304]   [7.921]   [3.587]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) 0.238*** 0.291*** 0.345*** 0.403*** 0.385***
[0.043]   [0.056]   [0.036]   [0.035]   [0.031]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.878*** 0.867*** 0.869*** 0.880*** 0.878***
[0.008]   [0.011]   [0.008]   [0.007]   [0.008]   
Constant -191.15*** -134.29*** -106.63*** -111.1*** -105.27***
[11.868]   [7.715]   [2.340]   [7.736]   [3.006]   
                                                
Observations 21,333 21,181 21,382 21,107 21,302
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Table 6 continued
Panel C: Coal
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Excess Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 0.133 0.041 0.160*  0.354*** 0.347***
[0.254]   [0.079]   [0.094]   [0.096]   [0.060]   
Environmental Performance 0 0 0.001*** 0 0.001***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance -0.011*  -0.002 -0.005** -0.003 -0.002*  
[0.006]   [0.002]   [0.002]   [0.002]   [0.001]   
Size -0.443*** -0.030*** -0.008*  -0.058*** 0.006*  
[0.013]   [0.004]   [0.005]   [0.005]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.370*** -0.005 -0.116*** 0.095*** 0.125***
[0.049]   [0.015]   [0.018]   [0.018]   [0.012]   
R&D 4.697*** -0.295*** -0.686*** 1.158*** 0.214***
[0.274]   [0.086]   [0.101]   [0.103]   [0.065]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.252*** 0.095*** -0.069*** 0.080*** 0.298***
[0.065]   [0.020]   [0.024]   [0.025]   [0.016]   
Constant 8.370*** 0.505*** 0.164** 1.144*** 0.699***
[0.181]   [0.057]   [0.067]   [0.069]   [0.043]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 12.919*** 4.974** 3.09 0.105 8.408
[3.643]   [2.433]   [1.909]   [1.800]   [5.130]   
Financial Performance 6.464*** 33.670*** 16.126*** -8.845 1.367
[1.341]   [10.672]   [5.748]   [6.217]   [2.806]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -5.208*** -30.554*** -16.767*** 8.401 -6.1
[1.482]   [10.145]   [6.334]   [6.055]   [4.102]   
Size 9.336*** 7.406*** 6.385*** 5.787*** 6.238***
[0.657]   [0.402]   [0.149]   [0.361]   [0.131]   
R&D 1.952 43.019*** 46.762*** 46.501*** 35.780***
[8.057]   [4.801]   [5.141]   [7.954]   [3.636]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance
(Country/Year) 0.306*** 0.344*** 0.372*** 0.390*** 0.407***
[0.040]   [0.045]   [0.036]   [0.036]   [0.032]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance
(Country/Industry) 0.876*** 0.870*** 0.869*** 0.876*** 0.875***
[0.007]   [0.009]   [0.008]   [0.007]   [0.008]   
Constant -159.61*** -123.21*** -107.07*** -96.07*** -106.96***
[11.416]   [6.136]   [2.283]   [7.612]   [3.038]   
                                                
Observations 20,520 20,369 20,568 20,294 20,488
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Table 6 continued
Panel D: Oil and gas
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Excess Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.369*** 0.055** -0.028 0.175*** 0.270***
[0.069]   [0.022]   [0.026]   [0.028]   [0.017]   
Environmental Performance 0 0.000*  0.001** 0 0.001***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance 0.005*** -0.001** 0 -0.001*** -0.002***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Size -0.429*** -0.034*** -0.006 -0.063*** 0.007** 
[0.012]   [0.004]   [0.004]   [0.005]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.377*** -0.006 -0.111*** 0.088*** 0.120***
[0.047]   [0.015]   [0.017]   [0.019]   [0.011]   
R&D 4.786*** -0.316*** -0.674*** 1.182*** 0.223***
[0.267]   [0.086]   [0.098]   [0.106]   [0.065]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.247*** 0.089*** -0.062*** 0.069*** 0.291***
[0.063]   [0.020]   [0.023]   [0.025]   [0.015]   
Constant 8.141*** 0.549*** 0.139** 1.249*** 0.677***
[0.171]   [0.055]   [0.063]   [0.069]   [0.042]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 17.925*** 6.764*** -2.023** 1.832 1.117
[2.260]   [2.213]   [0.796]   [1.282]   [1.825]   
Financial Performance 17.740*** 90.746*** 5.377 68.303*** -4.329
[1.553]   [18.319]   [5.629]   [11.064]   [2.851]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -11.255*** -85.382*** -2.858 -65.80*** -2.476
[1.202]   [17.402]   [5.625]   [10.693]   [1.691]   
Size 14.563*** 9.488*** 6.642*** 9.944*** 6.620***
[0.726]   [0.650]   [0.134]   [0.604]   [0.128]   
R&D -58.060*** 55.241*** 42.507*** -39.42*** 40.894***
[10.100]   [8.540]   [4.837]   [14.621]   [3.637]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) 0.145*** 0.245*** 0.379*** 0.530*** 0.385***
[0.052]   [0.075]   [0.031]   [0.066]   [0.030]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.865*** 0.850*** 0.864*** 0.880*** 0.871***
[0.011]   [0.016]   [0.007]   [0.014]   [0.008]   
Constant -249.41*** -153.22*** -109.46*** -182.2*** -105.49***
[12.707]   [10.053]   [2.042]   [12.550]   [2.922]   
                                                
Observations 21,999 21,837 22,047 21,747 21,965
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Appendix A
Explanation of corporate social responsibility variables (environmental dimensions)
Environmental Score
The environmental pillar measures a company's impact on living and non-living natural systems, including 
air, land, and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best management 
practices to avoid environmental risks and to capitalize on environmental opportunities to generate long-term 
shareholder value.
Emission Reduction
The emission reduction category measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness toward 
reducing environmental emissions in production and operational processes. It reflects a company's capacity to 
reduce air emissions (greenhouse gases, F-gases, ozone-depleting substances, NOx and SOx, etc.), waste, 
hazardous waste, water discharges, spills, or its impacts on biodiversity and to partner with environmental 
organizations to reduce the environmental impact of the company in the local or broader community.
Product Innovation
The product innovation category measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness toward 
supporting the research and development of eco-efficient products or services. It reflects a company's 
capacity to reduce the environmental costs and burdens for its customers, thereby creating new market 
opportunities through new environmental technologies and processes, or eco-designed, dematerialized 
products with extended durability.
Resource Reduction
The resource reduction category measures a company's management commitment and effectiveness toward 
achieving efficient use of natural resources in the production process. It reflects a company's capacity to 
reduce the use of materials, energy or water, and to find more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply 
chain management.
Emission Reduction [Policy] Does the company have a policy for reducing environmental emissions or its impacts on biodiversity? Does the company have a policy for maintaining an environmental management system?
Emission Reduction [Implementation]
Does the company describe the implementation of its emissions reduction policy through a public 
commitment from a senior management or board member? Does the company describe the implementation of 
its emission reduction policy through the processes in place?
Emission Reduction [Monitoring] Does the company monitor its emission reduction performance?
CO2 Equivalents Emission Total / USD Total Assets Total CO2 and CO2-equivalent emissions related to total assets.
CO2 Equivalents Emission Direct / USD Total Assets Direct CO2 and CO2-equivalent emissions related to total assets.
CO2 Equivalents Emission Indirect / USD Total Assets Indirect CO2 and CO2-equivalent emissions related to total assets.
NOx Emissions / USD Total Assets Total amount of NOx emissions emitted related to total assets.
SOx Emissions / USD Total Assets Total amount of SOx emissions emitted related to total assets.
VOC Emissions / USD Total Assets Total amount of volatile organic compounds (VOC) emissions related to total assets.
Waste Total / USD Total Assets Total amount of waste produced related to total assets.
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Appendix A continued
Non-Hazardous Waste / USD Total Assets Total amount of non-hazardous waste produced related to total assets.
Waste Recycled Total / USD Total Assets Total recycled and reused waste produced related to total assets.
Hazardous Waste / USD Total Assets Total amount of hazardous waste produced related to total assets.
Water Discharged / USD Total Assets Total volume of water discharged related to total assets.
Water Pollutant Emissions / USD Total Assets Total weight of water pollutant emissions related to total assets.
COD Effluents in Discharge / USD Total Assets Total weight of Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) in water discharged related to total assets.
Commercial Risks and/or Opportunities Due to Climate Change Is the company aware that climate change can represent commercial risks and/or opportunities?
Environmental Expenditures / USD Total Assets Total amount of environmental expenditures related to total assets.
Environmental Provisions / USD Total Assets Environmental provisions as reported within the balance sheet related to total assets.
Environmental Investments Initiatives Does the company report on making proactive environmental investments or expenditures to reduce future risks or increase future opportunities?
Emission Reduction [CO2 Reduction]
Does the company show an initiative to reduce, reuse, recycle, substitute, phase out or compensate CO2 
equivalents in the production process?
Emission Reduction [F-Gases Emissions] Does the company report on initiatives to recycle, reduce, reuse or phase out fluorinated gases such as HFCs (hydrofluorocarbons), PFCs (perfluorocarbons), and SF6 (sulfur hexafluoride)?
Emission Reduction [Ozone-Depleting Substances Reduction] Does the company report on initiatives to reduce, substitute, or phase out ozone-depleting (CFC-11 equivalents, chlorofluorocarbon) substances?
Emission Reduction [NOx and SOx Emissions Reduction] Does the company report on initiatives to reduce, reuse, recycle, substitute, or phase out NOx (nitrogen oxides) or SOx (sulfur oxides) emissions?
Emission Reduction [VOC Emissions Reduction] Does the company report on initiatives to reduce, substitute, or phase out volatile organic compounds (VOC) or particulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter (PM10)?
Emission Reduction [Innovative Production]
Does the company report on the concentration of production locations to limit environmental impact 
during the production process? Does the company report on its participation in any emissions trading 
initiative? Does the company report on new production techniques to improve the global environmental 
impact (all emissions) during the production process?
Product Produced Total / USD Total Assets Product produced related to total assets.
Resource Reduction [Policy] Does the company have a policy for reducing the use of natural resources? Does the company have a policy to lessen the environmental impact of its supply chain?
Resource Reduction [Improvements] Does the company set specific objectives to be achieved on resource efficiency? Does the company comment on the results of previously set objectives?
Energy Use Total / USD Total Assets Total direct and indirect energy consumption related to total assets.
Direct Energy Purchased / USD Total Assets Direct energy purchased related to total assets.
Electricity Purchased / USD Total Assets Electricity purchased related to total assets.
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Appendix B
Pooled OLS regression results for the relationship between fossil fuel firms  and 
environmental performance
Table B.1: Regression analysis for environmental categories
(Including only Australia, Canada, Japan, UK, and US)
This table reports pooled OLS regression results for the relationship between fossil fuel firms 
(Dummy_Fossil) and environmental performance score and its three categories, which are items 
determining categorical scores for emission reduction, product innovation, and resource reduction. 
The definitions of variables are given in Table 3. All regressions control country and year fixed 
effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are 
clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels.
Dependent Variables: Environmental performance scores
Variables Environment Emission Product Resource
Dummy_Fossil -6.547 1.527 -9.425* -8.446
[5.129] [4.605] [5.028] [5.398]   
Tobin’s Q 0.327 0.436* 0.007 0.589** 
[0.264] [0.263] [0.321] [0.277]   
Dummy_Fossil*Tobin’s Q 1.197 0.1 1.776* 1.249
[0.970] [0.953] [1.051] [1.227]   
Excess Stock Return -1.044** -1.189*** -0.368 -1.310***
[0.445] [0.460] [0.487] [0.461]   
Dummy_Fossil*Excess Stock 
Return 1.265 0.239 0.538 2.217
[1.157] [1.211] [1.184] [1.390]   
Return on Equity 1.537*** 1.350*** 1.501*** 1.401***
[0.459] [0.433] [0.463] [0.440]   
Dummy_Fossil*Return on 
Equity 1.525 0.886 3.647 -0.63
[2.089] [1.781] [2.503] [1.760]   
Business Risk -0.67 -0.15 -0.967*** -0.644
[0.429] [0.411] [0.372] [0.458]   
Dummy_Fossil*Business 
Risk 0.405 -1.254* 2.103** 0.481
[0.780] [0.732] [0.879] [0.871]   
Beta 0.46 0.311 0.11 0.604
[1.211] [1.175] [1.173] [1.182]   
Dummy_Fossil* Beta 3.394 3.638 2.319 2.562
 [3.878] [3.363] [3.671] [3.898]   
Size 14.629*** 14.429*** 9.953*** 14.385***
[0.482] [0.482] [0.515] [0.482]   
Leverage -0.348 -1.423 1.738 -1.803
[2.381] [2.304] [2.394] [2.390]   
R&D 85.826*** 62.285*** 109.139*** 61.502***
[14.143] [13.201] [14.349] [14.373]   
NetWorkingCapital 12.624*** 8.334*** 17.646*** 7.969***
[2.915] [2.865] [2.982] [3.055]   
Constant -179.369*** -170.382*** -115.443*** -174.329***
[7.222] [7.364] [7.725] [7.197]   
Adjusted R2 0.345 0.341 0.193 0.333
Observations 11,693 11,693 11,693 11,693
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Table B.2: Regression analysis for environmental categories
(Excluding UK and US)
This table reports pooled OLS regression results for the relationship between fossil fuel firms 
(Dummy_Fossil) and environmental performance score and its three categories, which are items 
determining categorical scores for emission reduction, product innovation, and resource reduction. 
The definitions of variables are given in Table 3. All regressions control country and year fixed 
effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are 
clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels.
Dependent Variables: Environmental performance scores
Variables Environment Emission Product Resource
Dummy_Fossil 17.975*** 18.242*** 20.123*** 8.133
[4.453] [4.103] [4.611] [4.996]   
Tobin’s Q 0.940** 0.720** 0.702* 1.159***
[0.366] [0.352] [0.372] [0.340]   
Dummy_Fossil*Tobin’s Q -2.378*** -1.714** -2.050*** -2.182***
[0.642] [0.679] [0.725] [0.636]   
Excess Stock Return -0.376 -0.75 0.41 -0.79
[0.505] [0.531] [0.529] [0.513]   
Dummy_Fossil*Excess Stock 
Return 1.754 1.124 1.065 2.449** 
[1.107] [1.193] [1.144] [1.231]   
Return on Equity 1.916* 1.753* 1.386 2.001** 
[0.984] [0.946] [0.976] [0.942]   
Dummy_Fossil*Return on 
Equity -0.584 -0.495 -0.569 -0.229
[1.742] [1.647] [1.696] [1.790]   
Business Risk -1.119** -0.529 -1.433*** -1.057** 
[0.506] [0.491] [0.447] [0.532]   
Dummy_Fossil*Business 
Risk 0.554 -0.717 2.107** 0.58
[0.757] [0.718] [0.823] [0.845]   
Beta 7.222*** 7.006*** 9.493*** 3.950***
[1.537] [1.575] [1.517] [1.530]   
Dummy_Fossil* Beta -8.924** -7.511** -12.670*** -3.66
 [3.609] [3.440] [3.677] [3.989]   
Size 13.613*** 13.813*** 9.674*** 13.375***
[0.489] [0.490] [0.473] [0.496]   
Leverage -2.675 -6.092** 3.205 -4.510*  
[2.668] [2.665] [2.551] [2.658]   
R&D 152.412*** 117.968*** 167.442*** 142.113***
[21.959] [19.989] [22.368] [21.687]   
NetWorkingCapital 4.919 2.481 7.181** 3.507
[3.099] [3.178] [2.940] [3.082]   
Constant -165.295*** -162.081*** -119.970*** -156.346***
[7.233] [7.450] [6.913] [7.329]   
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.368 0.335 0.351
Observations 13534 13534 13534 13534
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Table B.3: Regression analysis for environmental categories
(Excluding US)
This table reports pooled OLS regression results for the relationship between fossil fuel firms 
(Dummy_Fossil) and environmental performance score and its three categories, which are items 
determining categorical scores for emission reduction, product innovation, and resource reduction. 
The definitions of variables are given in Table 3. All regressions control country and year fixed 
effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are 
clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels.
Dependent Variables: Environmental performance scores
Variables Environment Emission Product Resource
Dummy_Fossil 14.644*** 14.913*** 16.344*** 6.308
[4.158] [3.924] [4.299] [4.643]   
Tobin’s Q 0.627** 0.418 0.537* 0.852***
[0.278] [0.261] [0.299] [0.264]   
Dummy_Fossil*Tobin’s Q -2.195*** -1.670** -2.151*** -1.721** 
[0.610] [0.662] [0.698] [0.670]   
Excess Stock Return -0.711 -0.924** 0.28 -1.332***
[0.448] [0.464] [0.479] [0.458]   
Dummy_Fossil*Excess Stock 
Return 1.662 0.973 1.161 2.330*  
[1.052] [1.131] [1.079] [1.216]   
Return on Equity 1.616*** 1.594*** 1.274** 1.391** 
[0.589] [0.579] [0.605] [0.590]   
Dummy_Fossil*Return on 
Equity -0.619 -0.293 -0.612 -0.015
[1.481] [1.429] [1.425] [1.652]   
Business Risk -1.010** -0.407 -1.330*** -0.973*  
[0.487] [0.468] [0.436] [0.510]   
Dummy_Fossil*Business 
Risk 0.505 -0.857 2.114*** 0.497
[0.721] [0.685] [0.811] [0.800]   
Beta 4.227*** 3.818*** 6.354*** 1.968
[1.361] [1.388] [1.383] [1.318]   
Dummy_Fossil* Beta -6.842** -4.689 -10.158*** -3.037
 [3.355] [3.321] [3.349] [3.692]   
Size 13.223*** 13.203*** 9.732*** 12.727***
[0.413] [0.412] [0.423] [0.417]   
Leverage -1.244 -3.339 1.871 -2.108
[2.303] [2.292] [2.272] [2.290]   
R&D 121.262*** 86.255*** 147.310*** 105.528***
[16.604] [15.569] [16.750] [17.527]   
NetWorkingCapital 8.012*** 5.613** 9.832*** 5.944** 
[2.631] [2.648] [2.700] [2.558]   
Constant -156.361*** -151.191*** -115.950*** -145.150***
[6.222] [6.386] [6.328] [6.259]   
Adjusted R2 0.394 0.357 0.311 0.343
Observations 15876 15876 15876 15876
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Appendix C
Pooled OLS regression results for fossil fuel firms: chemicals, coal, and gas and oil and environmental score
Table C.1: Regression analysis for environmental score of fossil fuel firms
(Including only Australia, Canada, Japan, UK, and US)
This table reports pooled OLS regression results for fossil fuel firms: chemicals, coal, and gas and oil 
(Dummy_Fossil) on environmental score, separately. Definitions of variables are given in Table 3. All regressions 
control country and year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. Robust standard errors presented in 
brackets are clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels.
Chemicals Coal Oil and gas
Dummy_Fossil 9.204 -21.694 -3.217
[11.457]   [13.434]   [5.630]   
Tobin’s Q 0.42 0.421 0.414
[0.263]   [0.264]   [0.261]   
Dummy_Fossil*Tobin’s Q -1.828 0.005 1.766
[3.374]   [0.827]   [1.230]   
Excess Stock Return -1.121** -1.163*** -1.157***
[0.446]   [0.447]   [0.443]   
Dummy_Fossil*Excess 
Stock Return -0.343 1.732 1.473
[3.576]   [2.551]   [1.378]   
Return on Equity 1.478*** 1.484*** 1.504***
[0.457]   [0.456]   [0.458]   
Dummy_Fossil*Return on 
Equity 2.211 -2.653 -0.318
[3.057]   [2.245]   [2.392]   
Business Risk -0.617 -0.619 -0.701*  
[0.432]   [0.429]   [0.424]   
Dummy_Fossil*Business 
Risk -7.048*  2.398*** 1.212*  
[3.869]   [0.879]   [0.706]   
Beta 0.467 0.453 0.644
[1.212]   [1.213]   [1.211]   
Dummy_Fossil* Beta 10.117** 12.225 -5.503
 [4.878]   [7.440]   [4.016]   
Size 14.672*** 14.554*** 14.658***
[0.490]   [0.497]   [0.492]   
Leverage -1.947 -1.914 -2.577
[2.481]   [2.505]   [2.418]   
R&D 80.774*** 79.571*** 80.626***
[13.998]   [14.008]   [13.904]   
NetWorkingCapital 10.643*** 10.432*** 10.744***
[3.007]   [3.005]   [2.907]   
Constant -181.592*** -180.188*** -179.267***
[7.367]   [7.468]   [7.366]   
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.35 0.359
Observations 10,482 10,197 11,216
22
Table C.2: Regression analysis for environmental score of fossil fuel firms
(Excluding UK and US)
This table reports pooled OLS regression results fossil fuel firms: chemicals, coal, and gas and oil (Dummy_Fossil) 
on environmental score, separately. Definitions of variables are given in Table 3. All regressions control country 
and year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are 
clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Chemicals Coal Oil and gas
Dummy_Fossil 16.165 10.548 13.810***
[10.830]   [11.954]   [5.128]   
Tobin’s Q 0.889** 0.896** 0.943** 
[0.368]   [0.370]   [0.368]   
Dummy_Fossil*Tobin’s Q -2.017 -0.748 -2.425***
[1.637]   [1.298]   [0.723]   
Excess Stock Return -0.407 -0.429 -0.446
[0.501]   [0.499]   [0.502]   
Dummy_Fossil*Excess 
Stock Return 1.815 1.578 1.32
[2.994]   [3.796]   [1.230]   
Return on Equity 2.042** 2.091** 1.958** 
[0.972]   [0.971]   [0.981]   
Dummy_Fossil*Return on 
Equity 1.268 -3.497*  -0.219
[2.360]   [1.898]   [2.940]   
Business Risk -1.205** -1.151** -1.099** 
[0.504]   [0.507]   [0.507]   
Dummy_Fossil*Business 
Risk -1.963 2.539*** 0.686
[3.702]   [0.903]   [0.737]   
Beta 7.063*** 7.035*** 7.181***
[1.547]   [1.546]   [1.536]   
Dummy_Fossil* Beta -2.491 -7.477 -8.918** 
 [9.412]   [7.612]   [3.845]   
Size 13.369*** 13.423*** 13.742***
[0.526]   [0.537]   [0.508]   
Leverage -3.092 -3.474 -3.86
[2.849]   [2.900]   [2.743]   
R&D 147.898*** 146.183*** 148.734***
[22.205]   [23.340]   [23.281]   
NetWorkingCapital 3.693 4.37 4.805
[3.367]   [3.399]   [3.152]   
Constant -161.785*** -162.712*** -166.285***
[7.727]   [7.848]   [7.437]   
Adjusted R2 0.397 0.392 0.404
Observations 12480 11917 12801
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Table C.3: Regression analysis for environmental score of fossil fuel firms
(Excluding US)
This table reports pooled OLS regression results for the effects of three fossil fuel-related industries: chemicals, 
coal, and gas and oil (Dummy_Fossil) on environmental score, separately. Definitions of variables are given in 
Table 3. All regressions control country and year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. Robust 
standard errors presented in brackets are clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Chemicals Coal Oil and gas
Dummy_Fossil 11.551 3.025 10.920** 
[9.852]   [11.655]   [4.902]   
Tobin’s Q 0.572** 0.579** 0.634** 
[0.277]   [0.277]   [0.278]   
Dummy_Fossil*Tobin’s Q -1.671 -0.421 -2.390***
[1.332]   [1.182]   [0.719]   
Excess Stock Return -0.765*  -0.787*  -0.779*  
[0.445]   [0.444]   [0.446]   
Dummy_Fossil*Excess 
Stock Return 1.574 0.738 1.513
[2.821]   [3.593]   [1.175]   
Return on Equity 1.670*** 1.689*** 1.624***
[0.583]   [0.582]   [0.588]   
Dummy_Fossil*Return on 
Equity 1.461 -3.806** 0.673
[1.985]   [1.573]   [3.036]   
Business Risk -1.085** -1.030** -0.986** 
[0.483]   [0.484]   [0.486]   
Dummy_Fossil*Business 
Risk -2.399 2.255** 0.732
[3.486]   [0.881]   [0.709]   
Beta 4.031*** 3.980*** 4.161***
[1.367]   [1.365]   [1.359]   
Dummy_Fossil* Beta 1.196 -2.268 -7.296** 
 [8.724]   [6.707]   [3.715]   
Size 12.977*** 13.001*** 13.339***
[0.441]   [0.448]   [0.425]   
Leverage -1.642 -1.931 -2.386
[2.434]   [2.468]   [2.359]   
R&D 116.052*** 113.775*** 116.788***
[16.587]   [17.099]   [17.088]   
NetWorkingCapital 7.274*** 7.773*** 7.847***
[2.804]   [2.816]   [2.662]   
Constant -152.864*** -153.285*** -157.084***
[6.609]   [6.677]   [6.361]   
Adjusted R2 0.384 0.381 0.393
Observations 14693 14100 15087
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Appendix D
3SLS estimation for simultaneous equation system for the relationship between fossil fuel firms  (Dummy_Fossil) and 
environmental performance and the effect of environmental score on financial performance
Table D1: Structure regression analysis for environmental score of fossil fuel firms
(Including only Australia, Canada, Japan, UK, and US)
This table reports 3SLS estimation for simultaneous equation system for the relationship between fossil fuel firms 
(Dummy_Fossil) and environmental performance, and the effect of environmental score on financial performance. Definitions 
of variables are given in Table 3. All regressions control country and year fixed effects. The sample period is from 2002 to 
2013. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A: All three fossil fuel-related industries combined
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Stock Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.538*** 0.032 -0.017 0.150*** 0.214***
[0.077]   [0.026]   [0.032]   [0.037]   [0.019]   
Environmental Performance -0.003** 0 0 0 0
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
DummyFossil*EnvironmentalPerformance. 0.008*** 0 0 -0.002** -0.001** 
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.000]   
Size -0.391*** -0.036*** 0.007 -0.088*** 0.003
[0.018]   [0.006]   [0.008]   [0.009]   [0.005]   
Leverage -0.279*** -0.004 -0.107*** 0.083*** 0.014
[0.062]   [0.021]   [0.026]   [0.030]   [0.016]   
R&D 5.500*** -0.190*  -0.512*** 1.120*** 0.186** 
[0.335]   [0.113]   [0.139]   [0.159]   [0.084]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.443*** 0.104*** -0.093*** 0.059 0.329***
[0.086]   [0.029]   [0.036]   [0.041]   [0.022]   
Constant 7.728*** 0.563*** -0.038 1.617*** 0.779***
[0.252] [0.085] [0.105] [0.122] [0.063]
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Table D.1 continued
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 40.079*** 12.428*** -3.239*** 7.886*** 13.162***
[5.007]   [3.559]   [1.081]   [2.563]   [3.905]   
Financial Performance 26.991*** 127.349*** -22.152*** 101.168*** 9.796***
[2.810]   [29.654]   [7.994]   [20.553]   [3.456]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -20.667*** -116.883*** 23.096*** -96.707*** -12.758***
[2.540]   [27.456]   [7.957]   [19.705]   [3.592]   
Size 19.741*** 12.574*** 8.375*** 14.784*** 8.396***
[1.251]   [1.139]   [0.216]   [1.431]   [0.182]   
R&D -120.427*** 49.031*** 33.723*** -65.984** 39.144***
[19.457]   [13.538]   [6.496]   [26.720]   [4.654]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) -0.391*** -0.538** 0.191*** 0.664*** 0.160***
[0.116]   [0.219]   [0.059]   [0.187]   [0.048]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.886*** 0.837*** 0.837*** 0.875*** 0.824***
[0.023]   [0.032]   [0.013]   [0.036]   [0.011]   
Constant -332.09*** -176.55*** -128.82*** -268.27*** -137.57***
[22.180]   [14.399]   [3.426]   [29.791]   [4.767]   
Observations 12036 11960 12053 11781 12037
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Table D.1 continued
Panel B: Chemicals
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Stock Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.683*** 0.015 0.079 -0.098 -0.027
[0.192]   [0.062]   [0.080]   [0.083]   [0.047]   
Environmental Performance -0.002** 0 0 -0.001 0.001** 
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance 0.008*** 0 -0.001 0.001 0.001** 
[0.003]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   
Size -0.418*** -0.029*** 0.004 -0.071*** -0.004
[0.020]   [0.006]   [0.008]   [0.009]   [0.005]   
Leverage -0.239*** -0.001 -0.124*** 0.107*** 0.018
[0.067]   [0.022]   [0.028]   [0.029]   [0.016]   
R&D 5.408*** -0.138 -0.526*** 1.135*** 0.161*  
[0.347]   [0.112]   [0.145]   [0.150]   [0.085]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.434*** 0.112*** -0.124*** 0.098** 0.348***
[0.092]   [0.030]   [0.039]   [0.040]   [0.023]   
Constant 8.103*** 0.468*** 0.009 1.338*** 0.896***
[0.279] [0.090] [0.117] [0.124] [0.069]
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 34.039*** 10.269*** 3.835*** 3.505*** 7.816
[6.348]   [2.934]   [1.410]   [1.200]   [5.229]   
Financial Performance 16.316*** 69.205*** 7.573 5.096 9.531***
[2.616]   [19.576]   [6.361]   [7.209]   [3.408]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -15.013*** -64.230*** -5.519 -4.728 -4.467
[3.190]   [18.284]   [6.966]   [8.459]   [4.607]   
Size 15.941*** 10.746*** 8.038*** 8.608*** 8.256***
[1.292]   [0.828]   [0.193]   [0.563]   [0.197]   
R&D -53.489*** 45.321*** 45.861*** 37.024*** 37.536***
[16.691]   [8.593]   [5.417]   [9.059]   [4.677]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) -0.215** -0.289*  0.136** 0.200*** 0.155***
[0.098]   [0.159]   [0.053]   [0.069]   [0.052]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.856*** 0.834*** 0.830*** 0.835*** 0.823***
[0.017]   [0.022]   [0.011]   [0.012]   [0.012]   
Constant -261.598*** -154.86*** -124.48*** -136.48*** -136.03***
[22.337]   [10.079]   [3.079]   [11.794]   [4.897]   
                                                            
Observations 10797 10725 10814 10568 10798
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Table D.1 continued
Panel C: Coal
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Stock Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 0.476 0.16 0.292** 0.424*** 0.215***
[0.334]   [0.107]   [0.139]   [0.150]   [0.082]   
Environmental Performance -0.002*  0 0 0 0.001** 
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance -0.017** -0.004 -0.008** -0.004 0.003
[0.008]   [0.003]   [0.004]   [0.004]   [0.002]   
Size -0.430*** -0.030*** 0.004 -0.080*** -0.004
[0.021]   [0.007]   [0.009]   [0.009]   [0.005]   
Leverage -0.210*** 0 -0.124*** 0.109*** 0.022
[0.068]   [0.022]   [0.028]   [0.030]   [0.017]   
R&D 5.367*** -0.129 -0.524*** 1.122*** 0.178** 
[0.354]   [0.114]   [0.147]   [0.158]   [0.087]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.464*** 0.112*** -0.126*** 0.087** 0.341***
[0.094]   [0.030]   [0.039]   [0.042]   [0.023]   
Constant 8.278*** 0.473*** 0.008 1.477*** 0.901***
[0.285] [0.092] [0.119] [0.130] [0.070]
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 19.792*** 5.394*  2.689 -0.278 16.811** 
[5.480]   [3.214]   [2.281]   [2.545]   [7.044]   
Financial Performance 9.368*** 37.673*** 11.757*  -12.15 10.277***
[2.132]   [13.923]   [6.474]   [7.482]   [3.412]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -8.451*** -33.183*** -13.818*  11.759 -13.700** 
[2.283]   [12.818]   [7.411]   [7.261]   [5.355]   
Size 12.652*** 9.540*** 7.977*** 7.297*** 8.238***
[1.070]   [0.596]   [0.200]   [0.589]   [0.198]   
R&D -13.955 42.917*** 46.763*** 54.643*** 35.883***
[13.468]   [5.999]   [5.581]   [9.446]   [4.684]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance
(Country/Year) -0.046 -0.077 0.161*** 0.127*  0.191***
[0.082]   [0.121]   [0.057]   [0.075]   [0.055]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance
(Country/Industry) 0.848*** 0.834*** 0.828*** 0.828*** 0.823***
[0.014]   [0.015]   [0.012]   [0.012]   [0.012]   
Constant -204.46*** -141.44*** -124.06*** -109.14*** -137.15***
[18.365]   [7.095]   [3.211]   [12.356]   [4.930]   
                                                            
Observations 10511 10440 10528 10282 10512
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Table D.1 continued
Panel D: Oil and gas
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Stock Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.599*** 0.031 -0.042 0.139*** 0.241***
[0.085]   [0.028]   [0.035]   [0.040]   [0.021]   
Environmental Performance -0.002** 0 0 0 0.000*  
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance 0.011*** 0 0 -0.001 -0.001** 
[0.002]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.000]   
Size -0.411*** -0.036*** 0.008 -0.083*** -0.001
[0.019]   [0.006]   [0.008]   [0.009]   [0.005]   
Leverage -0.251*** -0.007 -0.124*** 0.104*** 0.019
[0.064]   [0.021]   [0.027]   [0.030]   [0.016]   
R&D 5.478*** -0.17 -0.521*** 1.161*** 0.205** 
[0.338]   [0.113]   [0.141]   [0.159]   [0.085]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.431*** 0.097*** -0.104*** 0.087** 0.335***
[0.088]   [0.029]   [0.037]   [0.042]   [0.022]   
Constant 7.985*** 0.554*** -0.053 1.535*** 0.840***
[0.260] [0.087] [0.108] [0.124] [0.065]
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 26.792*** 8.448*** -3.798*** 4.018*  7.387***
[4.263]   [3.259]   [0.983]   [2.193]   [2.207]   
Financial Performance 22.954*** 105.634*** -11.609*  74.160*** 13.223***
[2.421]   [25.904]   [6.917]   [15.405]   [3.495]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -15.109*** -96.804*** 12.657*  -70.831*** -9.898***
[2.232]   [24.104]   [6.924]   [14.796]   [1.952]   
Size 18.525*** 12.056*** 8.424*** 13.234*** 8.496***
[1.120]   [1.016]   [0.192]   [1.090]   [0.186]   
R&D -96.305*** 47.306*** 37.692*** -38.072*  36.648***
[16.859]   [11.714]   [5.696]   [20.350]   [4.726]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) -0.330*** -0.451** 0.196*** 0.578*** 0.181***
[0.108]   [0.204]   [0.054]   [0.151]   [0.051]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.863*** 0.828*** 0.823*** 0.858*** 0.812***
[0.021]   [0.029]   [0.012]   [0.029]   [0.011]   
Constant -306.97*** -169.44*** -129.17*** -234.697*** -141.16***
[19.599]   [12.593]   [3.063]   [22.844]   [4.665]   
                                                            
Observations 11552 11477 11569 11303 11552
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Table D.2: Structure regression analysis for environmental score of fossil fuel firms
(Excluding UK and US)
This table reports 3SLS estimation for simultaneous equation system for the relationship between fossil fuel firms 
(Dummy_Fossil) and environmental performance, and the effect of environmental score on financial performance. 
Definitions of variables are given in Table 3. All regressions control country and year fixed effects. The sample period is 
from 2002 to 2013. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A: All three fossil fuel-related industries combined
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Stock Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.161** 0.007 -0.005 0.252*** 0.160***
[0.079]   [0.026]   [0.021]   [0.037]   [0.018]   
Environmental Performance 0.002*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.001*  0.002***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance. 0.001 0 0 -0.003*** -0.002***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.001]   [0.000]   
Size -0.441*** -0.035*** 0.003 -0.097*** 0.006*  
[0.014]   [0.005]   [0.004]   [0.007]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.458*** -0.001 -0.111*** 0.062** 0.137***
[0.065]   [0.021]   [0.017]   [0.030]   [0.015]   
R&D 3.519*** -0.917*** -0.981*** 2.090*** -0.195** 
[0.425]   [0.139]   [0.113]   [0.198]   [0.095]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.329*** 0.137*** -0.013 0.02 0.197***
[0.083]   [0.027]   [0.022]   [0.039]   [0.019]   
Constant 8.140*** 0.629*** 0.032 1.707*** 0.661***
[0.207]   [0.068]   [0.055]   [0.098]   [0.047]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 17.935*** 7.318*** -3.144*** 6.806*** -9.959** 
[2.147]   [1.863]   [1.047]   [1.962]   [4.579]   
Financial Performance 15.549*** 84.061*** -24.608** 91.944*** -7.273
[1.574]   [15.770]   [10.155]   [15.842]   [4.657]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -10.714*** -79.677*** 25.900*** -88.658*** 9.056** 
[1.172]   [14.969]   [9.947]   [15.246]   [4.571]   
Size 12.360*** 8.080*** 5.029*** 11.608*** 5.304***
[0.758]   [0.636]   [0.176]   [1.212]   [0.155]   
R&D -19.431*  97.011*** 23.055** -152.312*** 44.195***
[10.015]   [15.292]   [10.161]   [37.198]   [4.947]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) 0.116** 0.267*** 0.421*** 0.441*** 0.370***
[0.052]   [0.070]   [0.038]   [0.092]   [0.029]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.864*** 0.861*** 0.896*** 0.881*** 0.902***
[0.012]   [0.018]   [0.008]   [0.023]   [0.010]   
Constant -208.13*** -135.57*** -86.647*** -203.62*** -83.098***
[12.688]   [10.484]   [2.604]   [21.467]   [3.824]   
                                                            
Observations 13904 13805 13938 13660 13871
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Table D.2 continued
Panel B: Chemicals
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Stock Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.119 -0.024 0.023 -0.056 0.001
[0.162]   [0.051]   [0.043]   [0.067]   [0.036]   
Environmental Performance 0.002*** 0.000*  0.001*** 0 0.002***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance 0 0.001 0 0 0
[0.002]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.000]   
Size -0.457*** -0.032*** -0.002 -0.083*** 0.006*  
[0.015]   [0.005]   [0.004]   [0.006]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.461*** -0.01 -0.109*** 0.095*** 0.149***
[0.069]   [0.022]   [0.018]   [0.028]   [0.015]   
R&D 3.543*** -0.906*** -0.993*** 2.091*** -0.204** 
[0.432]   [0.137]   [0.114]   [0.179]   [0.096]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.304*** 0.131*** -0.021 0.082** 0.214***
[0.087]   [0.028]   [0.023]   [0.036]   [0.019]   
Constant 8.378*** 0.587*** 0.079 1.408*** 0.660***
[0.218]   [0.069]   [0.058]   [0.091]   [0.049]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 6.669*** 2.768** 2.343** 0.656 -4.964
[2.048]   [1.206]   [1.189]   [0.905]   [4.871]   
Financial Performance 6.153*** 33.387*** 24.876** 9.77 -4.54
[1.303]   [9.462]   [9.727]   [8.509]   [4.495]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -3.727*** -30.982*** -23.072** -7.919 5.212
[1.190]   [9.036]   [9.750]   [8.387]   [4.876]   
Size 7.762*** 5.946*** 4.907*** 5.393*** 4.782***
[0.666]   [0.404]   [0.182]   [0.689]   [0.161]   
R&D 14.112*  60.736*** 60.206*** 17.248 39.425***
[7.572]   [9.007]   [9.905]   [18.719]   [4.926]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) 0.260*** 0.318*** 0.310*** 0.390*** 0.366***
[0.041]   [0.043]   [0.042]   [0.034]   [0.031]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.891*** 0.892*** 0.894*** 0.905*** 0.910***
[0.008]   [0.010]   [0.009]   [0.008]   [0.010]   
Constant -132.47*** -101.84*** -83.040*** -94.909*** -78.907***
[11.034]   [6.593]   [2.667]   [12.446]   [3.736]   
                                                            
Observations 12811 12724 12845 12596 12779
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Table D.2 continued
Panel C: Coal
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Stock Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 0.543*  -0.071 0.153*  0.507*** 0.212***
[0.307]   [0.096]   [0.080]   [0.132]   [0.068]   
Environmental Performance 0.003*** 0.000*  0.000** 0 0.002***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance -0.018** 0 -0.004** -0.004 -0.003*  
[0.007]   [0.002]   [0.002]   [0.003]   [0.002]   
Size -0.468*** -0.032*** -0.003 -0.091*** 0.006*  
[0.016]   [0.005]   [0.004]   [0.007]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.448*** -0.012 -0.099*** 0.107*** 0.143***
[0.072]   [0.023]   [0.019]   [0.031]   [0.016]   
R&D 3.441*** -0.890*** -0.975*** 2.260*** -0.178*  
[0.458]   [0.144]   [0.120]   [0.196]   [0.101]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.326*** 0.131*** -0.018 0.067*  0.213***
[0.090]   [0.028]   [0.024]   [0.039]   [0.020]   
Constant 8.540*** 0.580*** 0.081 1.534*** 0.668***
[0.227]   [0.072]   [0.059]   [0.098]   [0.050]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 9.366** 4.324*  2.441 1.214 3.542
[3.835]   [2.571]   [2.215]   [2.234]   [6.617]   
Financial Performance 4.629*** 26.755*** 14.336*  0.357 -0.195
[1.319]   [8.778]   [8.380]   [7.072]   [4.538]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -3.614** -22.776*** -13.521 -0.778 -2.371
[1.420]   [8.469]   [8.898]   [6.853]   [5.913]   
Size 7.098*** 5.744*** 4.861*** 4.668*** 4.744***
[0.690]   [0.382]   [0.171]   [0.593]   [0.165]   
R&D 17.735** 56.198*** 51.228*** 36.135** 38.209***
[7.935]   [8.636]   [9.204]   [17.049]   [5.109]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance
(Country/Year) 0.308*** 0.352*** 0.364*** 0.408*** 0.398***
[0.042]   [0.042]   [0.039]   [0.033]   [0.032]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance
(Country/Industry) 0.892*** 0.892*** 0.895*** 0.904*** 0.901***
[0.008]   [0.010]   [0.008]   [0.008]   [0.011]   
Constant -121.34*** -98.714*** -83.434*** -82.029*** -82.448***
[11.339]   [6.205]   [2.521]   [10.586]   [3.742]   
                                                            
Observations 12246 12159 12279 12031 12213
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Table D.2 continued
Panel D: Oil and gas
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q Stock Return ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.230** 0.037 -0.023 0.293*** 0.193***
[0.094]   [0.031]   [0.025]   [0.044]   [0.021]   
Environmental Performance 0.002*** 0.000** 0.000*  0 0.002***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance 0.004** -0.001 0.001 -0.003*** -0.002***
[0.002]   [0.001]   [0.000]   [0.001]   [0.000]   
Size -0.454*** -0.035*** 0.001 -0.097*** 0.007** 
[0.015]   [0.005]   [0.004]   [0.007]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.446*** -0.005 -0.094*** 0.092*** 0.135***
[0.068]   [0.022]   [0.018]   [0.031]   [0.015]   
R&D 3.559*** -0.886*** -0.950*** 2.335*** -0.155
[0.447]   [0.145]   [0.117]   [0.205]   [0.100]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.294*** 0.128*** -0.012 0.049 0.206***
[0.086]   [0.028]   [0.023]   [0.040]   [0.019]   
Constant 8.316*** 0.620*** 0.049 1.673*** 0.656***
[0.216]   [0.071]   [0.057]   [0.100]   [0.048]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 15.345*** 5.538*** -4.661*** 4.549** 4.538*  
[2.235]   [1.916]   [1.153]   [1.895]   [2.667]   
Financial Performance 14.911*** 67.385*** -30.970*** 71.381*** 13.100***
[1.610]   [13.725]   [10.290]   [11.684]   [4.878]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -10.055*** -64.717*** 32.668*** -69.008*** -6.564***
[1.201]   [13.147]   [10.060]   [11.281]   [2.540]   
Size 12.377*** 7.616*** 5.026*** 10.408*** 5.024***
[0.801]   [0.564]   [0.193]   [0.942]   [0.175]   
R&D -24.312** 87.000*** 14.819 -122.666*** 41.043***
[10.681]   [13.726]   [11.024]   [30.106]   [5.272]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) 0.130** 0.296*** 0.456*** 0.441*** 0.398***
[0.053]   [0.062]   [0.042]   [0.078]   [0.031]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.862*** 0.865*** 0.896*** 0.883*** 0.866***
[0.012]   [0.016]   [0.009]   [0.019]   [0.011]   
Constant -206.99*** -127.47*** -87.114*** -181.28*** -96.293***
[13.293]   [9.276]   [2.849]   [16.562]   [3.750]   
                                                            
Observations 13161 13064 13194 12923 13127
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Table D.3: Structure regression analysis for environmental score of fossil fuel firms
(Excluding US)
This table reports 3SLS estimation for simultaneous equation system for the relationship between fossil fuelfirms 
(Dummy_Fossil) and environmental performance, and the effect of environmental score on financial performance. 
Definitions of variables are given in Table 3. All regressions control country and year fixed effects. The sample period is 
from 2002 to 2013. Robust standard errors presented in brackets are clustered at the firm level, and ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Panel A: All three fossil fuel-related industries combined
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q ExcessReturn ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.227*** 0.015 -0.006 0.232*** 0.164***
[0.078]   [0.025]   [0.024]   [0.033]   [0.017]   
Environmental Performance 0.001*  0.000*  0.000** 0.001** 0.001***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance. 0.002*  0 0 -0.003*** -0.002***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Size -0.454*** -0.034*** -0.004 -0.080*** 0.020***
[0.014]   [0.004]   [0.004]   [0.006]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.472*** -0.035*  -0.115*** 0.049** 0.102***
[0.060]   [0.019]   [0.019]   [0.025]   [0.013]   
R&D 5.520*** -0.429*** -0.516*** 1.537*** -0.1
[0.371]   [0.118]   [0.114]   [0.153]   [0.079]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.085 0.088*** -0.053** 0.038 0.211***
[0.076]   [0.024]   [0.023]   [0.032]   [0.016]   
Constant 8.383*** 0.600*** 0.120** 1.486*** 0.462***
[0.197]   [0.063]   [0.061]   [0.082]   [0.042]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 21.366*** 9.264*** -2.052** 7.896*** -9.842** 
[2.463]   [2.222]   [0.888]   [2.054]   [4.107]   
Financial Performance 18.393*** 98.820*** -13.727*  106.040*** -7.924*  
[1.824]   [18.766]   [7.996]   [17.821]   [4.164]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -12.403*** -93.670*** 14.914*  -102.436*** 9.176** 
[1.332]   [17.796]   [7.865]   [17.183]   [4.111]   
Size 13.610*** 8.395*** 4.956*** 11.273*** 5.268***
[0.877]   [0.721]   [0.161]   [1.143]   [0.159]   
R&D -69.056*** 61.276*** 31.892*** -131.420*** 38.592***
[12.996]   [12.211]   [5.611]   [31.685]   [4.222]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) 0.051 0.231*** 0.404*** 0.502*** 0.370***
[0.060]   [0.081]   [0.034]   [0.097]   [0.028]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.868*** 0.863*** 0.890*** 0.870*** 0.897***
[0.012]   [0.019]   [0.008]   [0.023]   [0.009]   
Constant -229.52*** -138.73*** -86.13*** -207.295*** -82.79***
[14.643]   [11.456]   [2.345]   [21.640]   [3.104]   
                                                            
Observations 16296 16165 16339 16040 16263
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Table D.3 continued
Panel B: Chemicals
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q ExcessReturn ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.125 -0.015 0.031 -0.055 -0.006
[0.161]   [0.049]   [0.050]   [0.059]   [0.034]   
Environmental Performance 0.002** 0 0.001*** 0 0.001***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance 0 0 -0.001 0 0
[0.002]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.001]   [0.000]   
Size -0.472*** -0.031*** -0.009*  -0.068*** 0.021***
[0.014]   [0.004]   [0.004]   [0.005]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.474*** -0.042** -0.116*** 0.074*** 0.109***
[0.063]   [0.020]   [0.020]   [0.023]   [0.013]   
R&D 5.540*** -0.413*** -0.528*** 1.550*** -0.1
[0.377]   [0.116]   [0.117]   [0.138]   [0.080]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.042 0.081*** -0.063** 0.087*** 0.223***
[0.080]   [0.025]   [0.025]   [0.029]   [0.017]   
Constant 8.652*** 0.559*** 0.169*** 1.224*** 0.451***
[0.207]   [0.064]   [0.064]   [0.077]   [0.044]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 7.934*** 3.729*** 1.911*  1.37 -1.764
[2.136]   [1.351]   [1.044]   [0.974]   [4.478]   
Financial Performance 7.259*** 39.396*** 16.159** 15.944*  -1.794
[1.504]   [10.761]   [7.698]   [9.322]   [4.051]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -4.178*** -37.010*** -14.776*  -13.716 2.245
[1.194]   [10.262]   [7.797]   [9.280]   [4.493]   
Size 8.265*** 6.062*** 4.832*** 5.615*** 4.687***
[0.767]   [0.437]   [0.169]   [0.628]   [0.166]   
R&D -8.133 44.105*** 40.876*** 7.627 33.853***
[9.925]   [6.650]   [5.601]   [15.442]   [4.190]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) 0.235*** 0.306*** 0.333*** 0.407*** 0.370***
[0.045]   [0.047]   [0.037]   [0.038]   [0.030]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.891*** 0.891*** 0.893*** 0.899*** 0.902***
[0.008]   [0.011]   [0.008]   [0.008]   [0.009]   
Constant -141.30*** -103.24*** -83.108*** -101.24*** -80.54***
[12.664]   [6.877]   [2.429]   [12.211]   [3.037]   
                                                            
Observations 15071 14952 15114 14847 15039
35
Table D.3 continued
Panel C: Coal
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q ExcessReturn ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 0.307 -0.053 0.209** 0.476*** 0.197***
[0.300]   [0.091]   [0.092]   [0.114]   [0.063]   
Environmental Performance 0.002** 0 0.001** 0 0.001***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance -0.016** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.004*  -0.003*  
[0.007]   [0.002]   [0.002]   [0.003]   [0.001]   
Size -0.482*** -0.031*** -0.009** -0.074*** 0.022***
[0.015]   [0.005]   [0.005]   [0.006]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.453*** -0.045** -0.102*** 0.081*** 0.104***
[0.066]   [0.020]   [0.020]   [0.025]   [0.014]   
R&D 5.592*** -0.373*** -0.483*** 1.619*** -0.083
[0.395]   [0.121]   [0.122]   [0.149]   [0.083]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.061 0.082*** -0.060** 0.079** 0.224***
[0.082]   [0.025]   [0.025]   [0.031]   [0.017]   
Constant 8.789*** 0.548*** 0.169** 1.326*** 0.453***
[0.215]   [0.066]   [0.066]   [0.082]   [0.045]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 10.020** 5.115** 2.095 2.475 7.101
[4.018]   [2.575]   [1.985]   [2.198]   [6.011]   
Financial Performance 4.456*** 28.747*** 6.917 7.272 2.309
[1.475]   [9.530]   [7.021]   [7.911]   [4.114]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -3.689** -25.863*** -7.865 -7.468 -5.645
[1.544]   [9.222]   [7.375]   [7.664]   [5.470]   
Size 6.929*** 5.704*** 4.738*** 5.057*** 4.593***
[0.769]   [0.395]   [0.162]   [0.549]   [0.171]   
R&D 5.728 40.590*** 36.166*** 19.754 32.603***
[10.046]   [5.943]   [5.364]   [13.932]   [4.310]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance
(Country/Year) 0.306*** 0.345*** 0.382*** 0.418*** 0.401***
[0.044]   [0.043]   [0.036]   [0.035]   [0.031]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance
(Country/Industry) 0.893*** 0.892*** 0.895*** 0.900*** 0.895***
[0.008]   [0.009]   [0.008]   [0.008]   [0.009]   
Constant -119.26*** -97.95*** -82.97*** -90.63*** -83.14***
[12.587]   [6.162]   [2.329]   [10.548]   [3.053]   
                                                            
Observations 14475 14357 14517 14251 14442
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Table D.3 continued
Panel D: Oil and gas
Financial Performance Measures
Tobin’s Q ExcessReturn ROE Business risk Beta
Financial Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil -0.297*** 0.046 -0.03 0.269*** 0.205***
[0.093]   [0.029]   [0.029]   [0.038]   [0.020]   
Environmental Performance 0.001*  0 0.000*  0 0.001***
[0.001]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.000]   
Dummy_Fossil*EnvironmentalPerformance 0.005*** -0.001*  0.001 -0.003*** -0.002***
[0.002]   [0.000]   [0.000]   [0.001]   [0.000]   
Size -0.468*** -0.034*** -0.006 -0.079*** 0.022***
[0.014]   [0.004]   [0.004]   [0.006]   [0.003]   
Leverage -0.454*** -0.039*  -0.102*** 0.070*** 0.099***
[0.063]   [0.020]   [0.019]   [0.025]   [0.013]   
R&D 5.653*** -0.384*** -0.468*** 1.673*** -0.071
[0.385]   [0.122]   [0.118]   [0.156]   [0.082]   
NetWorkingCapital 0.042 0.078*** -0.055** 0.063** 0.218***
[0.079]   [0.025]   [0.024]   [0.032]   [0.017]   
Constant 8.576*** 0.596*** 0.137** 1.448*** 0.452***
[0.205]   [0.065]   [0.063]   [0.084]   [0.044]   
Environmental Performance Equations
Dummy_Fossil 17.457*** 7.098*** -3.624*** 5.162*** 2.481
[2.466]   [2.235]   [0.985]   [1.906]   [2.305]   
Financial Performance 17.108*** 80.488*** -18.604** 81.223*** 4.814
[1.813]   [16.530]   [8.260]   [13.027]   [4.197]   
Dummy_Fossil*Financial Performance -11.230*** -76.795*** 21.122*** -78.644*** -4.054*  
[1.333]   [15.770]   [8.121]   [12.597]   [2.193]   
Size 13.358*** 7.900*** 4.936*** 10.020*** 5.009***
[0.901]   [0.648]   [0.175]   [0.876]   [0.174]   
R&D -68.773*** 56.026*** 28.386*** -100.285*** 35.873***
[13.414]   [10.764]   [6.047]   [24.829]   [4.334]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Year) 0.071 0.263*** 0.430*** 0.487*** 0.396***
[0.060]   [0.072]   [0.037]   [0.081]   [0.030]   
Mean EnvironmentalPerformance 
(Country/Industry) 0.867*** 0.867*** 0.890*** 0.872*** 0.877***
[0.012]   [0.017]   [0.008]   [0.019]   [0.009]   
Constant -223.60*** -130.50*** -86.225*** -182.35*** -89.836***
[14.899]   [10.236]   [2.525]   [16.471]   [2.971]   
                                                            
Observations 15496 15368 15538 15246 15462
Environmental and Financial Performance
of Fossil Fuel Firms: A Closer Inspection of their Interaction
Highlights
 We investigate an international sample of firms for the period 2002-2013.
 We compare fossil fuel intense firms among themselves and with other 
non-fossil fuel intense firms.
 We find that fossil fuel firms are generally assessed better regarding their 
efforts to improve environmental performance.
 Environmental outperformance seems to reduce their financial returns, but 
can be beneficial from a risk management perspective.
 Among the fossil fuel firms, there are remarkable differences regarding 
performance and relation between financial and environmental indicators.
